Large-scale Privatization via Auctions: The case of land in transforming economies

Description

Successful large-scale privatization programs for highly political resources such as land require the consideration not only of economic but also of ethical aspects. On the basis of a game-theoretic framework of analysis, Jocelyn Braun shows that the mechanism of auctioning is an efficient and equitable alternative to many privatization methods that have so far been implemented with disappointing results. The author presents a solution concept and - using Bayesian mechanism design - expands the current theoretical and practice-oriented literature in the light of transformation. Front Matter....Pages I-XV Introduction: Overview of the problems and issues in transformation....Pages 1-14 Privatization: Concept, theory, issues and experiences....Pages 15-51 Objectives and scope of the study....Pages 53-59 The theory of incentives and mechanism design....Pages 61-81 Auction mechanisms....Pages 83-119 Auctions in privatization....Pages 121-133 Modeling an auction mechanism for land....Pages 135-147 Summary and conclusions: Issues and implications in the use of auctions for land privatization....Pages 149-155 Zusammenfassung....Pages 157-159 References....Pages 161-171 Back Matter....Pages 172-172