Epistemic Autonomy

Description

This is the first book dedicated to the topic of epistemic autonomy. It features original essays from leading scholars that promise to significantly shape future debates in this emerging area of epistemology. While the nature of and value of autonomy has long been discussed in ethics and social and political philosophy, it remains an underexplored area of epistemology. The essays in this collection take up several interesting questions and approaches related to epistemic autonomy. Topics include the nature of epistemic autonomy, whether epistemic paternalism can be justified, autonomy as an epistemic value and/or vice, and the relation of epistemic autonomy to social epistemology and epistemic injustice. Epistemic Autonomy will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology, ethics, and social and political philosophy. Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents Contributors Acknowledgments Introduction: Puzzles Concerning Epistemic Autonomy 1 The Nature of Epistemic Autonomy 1.1 Summaries 2 Epistemic Autonomy and Paternalism 2.1 Chapter Summaries 3 Epistemic Autonomy and Epistemic Virtue and Value 3.1 Chapter Summaries 4 Epistemic Autonomy and Social Epistemology 4.1 Chapter Summaries Notes References Part I: The Nature of Epistemic Autonomy Chapter 1: Epistemic Autonomy and Externalism 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5.1 1.5.2 1.6 Notes References Chapter 2: Autonomy, Reflection, and Education 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Autonomy and Education: An Overview 2.3 The Argument 2.4 Accounts of Autonomy 2.5 Characterizing Reflection 2.6 Skillful and Unskillful Reflection 2.7 The Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection 2.8 Education and Reflection 2.9 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 3: The Realm of Epistemic Ends 3.1 Individualism 3.2 Interdependence 3.3 Heteronomy 3.4 Heteronomous Belief 3.5 From Belief to Acceptance 3.6 Condemned to Freedom 3.7 Kant Redux 3.8 Epistemic Communities Notes References Chapter 4: Professional Philosophy Has an Epistemic Autonomy Problem 4.1 Introduction 4.1.1 Thesis 4.1.2 Epistemic Autonomy in General 4.1.3 Epistemic Self-governance: What It Is and What It Is Not 4.1.4 Self-governance Is Not Self-Reliance 4.1.5 Self-governance Is a Spectrum 4.2 How Much Autonomy? 4.3 Thwarted Autonomy 4.3.1 Early Career Philosophers and Pressure to Transfer Agency 4.3.2 Autonomy Impediment at Any Career Stage 4.3.3 Publishing, Threats to Self-Governance, and Bad Epistemic Consequences 4.3.4 A Tentative Assessment 4.4 Can Things Change? 4.4.1 Pie in the Sky and Welcome to the Real World. 4.4.2 A Worthy Cause? Notes References Part II: Epistemic Autonomy and Paternalism Chapter 5: Norms of Inquiry, Student-Led Learning, and Epistemic Paternalism 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Open-ended Inquiry 5.3 Norms of Inquiry and Finite Brainpower 5.4 Student-led Learning 5.5 Epistemic Autonomy and Foreign Wills 5.6 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 6: Persuasion and Intellectual Autonomy 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Tackling Climate Change Skepticism 6.3 Marketing and Intellectual Autonomy 6.4 Riley on Nudging and Epistemic Injustice 6.5 Meehan on Nudging and Epistemic Vices 6.6 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 7: What’s Epistemic about Epistemic Paternalism? 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Defining Epistemic Paternalism 7.3 Epistemic and General Paternalism 7.4 Evaluating Epistemic Paternalism 7.5 Epistemic Paternalism and Social Epistemology 7.6 Conclusion Acknowledgments Notes References Part III: Epistemic Autonomy and Epistemic Virtue and Value Chapter 8: Intellectual Autonomy and Intellectual Interdependence 8.1 Intellectual Autonomy: The Trait, Excesses, and Deficiencies 8.1.1 The Trait of Intellectual Autonomy 8.1.2 Excesses of the Trait of Intellectual Autonomy 8.1.3 Deficiencies of the Trait of Intellectual Autonomy 8.2 Intellectual Interdependence: the Trait, Excesses, and Deficiencies 8.2.1 The Trait of Intellectual Interdependence 8.2.2 Excesses of the Trait of Intellectual Interdependence 8.2.3 Deficiencies of the Trait of Intellectual Interdependence 8.3 The Virtues of Intellectual Autonomy and Intellectual Interdependence 8.4 Objections and Open Questions Notes References Chapter 9: The Virtue of Epistemic Autonomy 9.1 Introduction 9.2 What Is an Intellectual Virtue? 9.3 Misconceptions 9.4 Alternative Accounts 9.5 The Account and Its Virtues 9.6 Exercising EA – The Factors 9.6.1 Knowledge 9.6.2 The Epistemically Best Available 9.6.3 Epistemic Harm and Injustice 9.6.4 Expertise 9.6.5 Understanding 9.6.6 Managing New Evidence 9.6.7 Developing Intellectual Virtue 9.7 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 10: Understanding and the Value of Intellectual Autonomy 10.1 Intellectual Autonomy and Its Value 10.2 Autonomy and Agency 10.3 Understanding and Intellectual Autonomy 10.3.1 Pritchard on “Seeing for Oneself” and Intellectual Autonomy 10.3.2 “Coming to Understand” 10.3.3 Understanding, Intellectual Autonomy, and Epistemic Competences 10.4 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 11: Epistemic Myopia 11.1 Introduction 11.2 The Problem 11.3 A Dialogical Model of Foundational Epistemic Well-being 11.4 Epistemic Myopia 11.5 Corroborating Cognitive Neuroscience Notes References Chapter 12: Intellectual Autonomy and Its Vices 12.1 Intellectual Autonomy as Answerability 12.2 Answerability and Recognition 12.3 Oppression, Testimonial Injustice, and Intellectual Autonomy 12.4 Heteronomy and Hyper-autonomy Notes References Chapter 13: Gaslighting, Humility, and the Manipulation of Rational Autonomy 13.1 Rational Autonomy and Intellectual Humility 13.2 Rational Autonomy in Contexts of Social Dependence 13.3 Communicative Challenges to Reason-Possession 13.4 Gaslighting as Dispossession Notes References Part IV: Epistemic Autonomy and Social Epistemology Chapter 14: Epistemic Autonomy for Social Epistemologists: The Case of Moral Inheritance 14.1 Introduction1 14.2 The Moral Inheritance View and the Objection from Autonomy 14.3 Making The Autonomy Requirement More Precise 14.4 The Objection from Epistemic Reductionism 14.5 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 15: Epistemic Autonomy and the Right to be Confident 15.1 Introduction 15.2 Epistemic Autonomy (EA) 15.3 The Right to be Confident 15.4 From the Right to Be Confident to EA? 15.5 A Counterexample 15.6 EA and Our Practices of Epistemic Reliance 15.7 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 16: We Owe It to Others to Think for Ourselves 16.1 The Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy 16.2 Direct Egoism, Indirect Egoism, and Altruism 16.3 Understanding and Direct Egoism 16.4 Disagreement and Indirect Egoism 16.5 Consensus and Altruism Notes References Chapter 17: Epistemic Self-Governance and Trusting the Word of Others: Is There a Conflict? 17.1 Practical and Epistemic Self-Governance and Trust 17.2 Self-Governance of One’s Actions and Desires 17.3 Self-Governance in Belief Formation and Sustaining 17.4 A Definition of Reliance 17.5 Trust-Based Reliance 17.6 A Key Role for Trust-Based Reliance 17.7 Alternative Approaches; Conclusion Notes References Index