African Communitarianism and the Misanthropic Argument for Anti-Natalism

Description

Anti-natalism is the provocative view that it is either always or almost always all-things-considered wrong to procreate. Philanthropic anti-natalist arguments say that procreation is always impermissible because of the harm done to individuals who are brought into existence. Misanthropic arguments, on the other hand, hold that procreation is usually impermissible given the harm that individuals will do once brought into existence. The main purpose of this short monograph is to demonstrate that David Benatar’s misanthropic argument for anti-natalism ought to be endorsed by any version of African Communitarianism. Not only that, but there are also resources in the African philosophical tradition that offer unique support for the argument. Given the emphasis that indigenous African worldviews place on the importance of procreation and the immediate family unit this result is highly surprising. This book marks the first attempt to bring anti-natalism into conversation with contemporary African ethics. Preface Acknowledgements Contents About the Author 1: Introduction 1.1 Introduction 1.2 What is African Philosophy? 1.3 The Purpose of this Book 1.4 The Policy Objection 1.5 A Disclaimer About Methodology 1.6 Conclusion References 2: What is African Communitarianism? 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Personhood as African Communitarianism 2.3 Modal Relational African Communitarianism 2.4 Life Force as African Communitarianism 2.5 Conclusion References 3: Benatar’s Misanthropic Argument for Anti-Natalism 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Modal Scope of Arguments for Anti-Natalism 3.3 Benatar’s Misanthropic Argument 3.4 Premise (2) of Benatar’s Misanthropic Argument 3.4.1 Harm to Humans 3.4.2 Harm to Animals 3.4.3 Harm to the Environment 3.5 Premise (1) of Benatar’s Misanthropic Argument 3.6 The Presumptive Duty not to Procreate 3.7 The Modal Scope of the Misanthropic Argument Revisited 3.8 Conclusion References 4: African Communitarianism and Benatar’s Misanthropic Argument for Anti-Natalism 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Harm to Humans on African Communitarianism 4.2.1 Harm to Humans on Personhood Accounts 4.2.2 Harm to Humans on Metz’s Modal Relational Account 4.2.3 Harm to Humans on Life Force Accounts 4.2.4 How Can the Health of the Community Matter if the Community Doesn’t Exist? 4.2.5 Sub-Conclusion 4.3 Harm to Non-Human Animals on African Communitarianism 4.3.1 The Anthropocentric Challenge 4.3.2 African Communitarianism and the Interconnectedness of Everything 4.3.3 Hierarchy and Life Force 4.3.4 Metz’s Modal Relational Theory 4.3.5 Behrens’ ‘Web of Life’ Environmentalism 4.3.6 Ogungbemi’s Nature-Relatedness and Eco-Bio Communitarianism 4.3.7 What About Animal Sacrifice? 4.3.8 Sub-Conclusion 4.4 Harm to the Environment on African Communitarianism 4.4.1 Nature and Life Force 4.4.2 Nature and Behrens’ Web of Life 4.4.3 Non-Living Nature and Chemhuru’s Aesthetic Value/Telos 4.4.4 Sub-Conclusion 4.5 The African Communitarian Misanthropic Argument for Anti-Natalism 4.6 Objections 4.6.1 The Scope in (1*) Is Too Wide 4.6.2 Why Isn’t this Just an Argument that We Need to Change the World? 4.6.3 Won’t Any Plausible Ethical Theory Endorse Benatar’s Argument? 4.6.4 Can African Communitarianism Really Recommend Anti-Natalism? 4.7 Conclusion References 5: Conclusion 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Observation, Puzzle, or Problem? 5.3 What About the Philanthropic Arguments? 5.4 Future Directions 5.5 Conclusion Index