Bus Transportation: Demand, Economics, Contracting, and Policy

Description

Bus Transport: Demand, Economics, Contracting, and Policy examines in one source the most critical and current research themes of public transport relevant to regulators, planners, operators, researchers and educators. It highlights the wider economic impacts of public transport and compares energy usage across all public transport modes. The book examines the evolving debate on Mobility as a Service (MaaS) and includes discussion of such themes as; public image issues, performance measurement and monitoring, contract procurement and design models, travel choice and demand, and global public transport reform. The book reflects the leading perspectives on the preservation and health of the bus sector, intending to move public transport reform forward. Compiles in one source up-to-date insights on important public transport themes, issues, and debates Examines a wide range of public transport topics in the multidisciplinary fields of economics, policy, operations, and planningBridges the gap between scientific research and policy implementation Cover Bus Transport: Demand, Economics, Contracting, and Policy Copyright Dedication List of previous sources of publication Reviews Contracting Bus rapid transit Image Elasticities Crowding System wide multi-modal assessment Transport appraisal Energy Social exclusion Mobility as a service About the author 1 - Introduction Part I: Reviews 2 - Public service contracts in the bus sector 2.1 Introduction and background 2.2 Contract theory and risk 2.3 Efficient contracting 2.3.1 The output that the principal cares about can be easily described 2.3.2 The agent has considerable discretion in their actions 2.3.3 The agent owns assets 2.4 Why are performance-based contracts so rare? 2.5 An overview of contract regimes in passenger transport 2.5.1 Competitive tendering 2.5.2 Negotiated performance-based contracts 2.6 Establishing a setting in which to compare the performance of operators 2.7 Conclusions 3 - Disruptive technology and moving people 3.1 Scope 3.2 Disruptive technological changes affecting land passenger transport 3.2.1 Scope 3.2.2 Smartphone based apps, shared mobility and MaaS 3.2.3 Autonomous vehicles 3.2.4 Electric vehicles 3.2.5 Conclusion 3.3 Assessing improvements in societal wellbeing 3.3.1 Common goals for cities and regions 3.3.2 Performance indicators 3.4 Some societal trends relevant to technological disruption in land passenger transport 3.4.1 Context 3.4.2 Ageing population 3.4.3 Have your own or be part of a sharing economy? 3.4.3.1 Shared economy 3.4.3.2 New mobility services and millenials 3.4.3.3 Shared vehicle use 3.4.4 Rise of the knowledge economy 3.4.5 Land use transport integration 3.4.6 Increasing inequality 3.4.7 Reducing greenhouse gas emissions 3.4.8 Conclusion 3.5 Scenarios 3.5.1 Two future scenarios and their potential effects 3.5.2 An optimistic scenario 3.5.2.1 User impacts 3.5.2.2 External benefits/costs 3.5.3 A pessimistic scenario 3.5.4 Implications for public transport 3.5.4.1 Markets subject to most pressure for change 3.5.4.2 Public transport service subsidies 3.6 Policy implications 3.6.1 Context 3.6.2 Improved governance arrangements 3.6.3 Containing urban sprawl 3.6.4 Transport pricing reform 3.6.5 Mandatory emissions standards Appendix 3.A 4 - The influence of the Thredbo series∗ 5 - Competition and ownership in land passenger transport: the Thredbo story 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Market arbitration 5.2.1 The early years 5.2.2 Turn of the century 5.2.3 Recent developments 5.3 Procurement mechanism 5.3.1 The early years 5.3.2 Turn of the century 5.3.3 Recent developments 5.4 Asset ownership 5.4.1 The early years 5.4.2 Turn of the century 5.4.3 Recent developments 5.5 Contract design 5.5.1 The early years 5.5.2 Turn of the century 5.5.3 Recent developments 5.6 Risk allocation 5.6.1 The early years 5.6.2 Turn of the century 5.6.3 Recent developments 5.7 Contract management 5.7.1 The early years 5.7.2 Turn of the century 5.7.3 Recent developments 5.8 Looking to the future: the next 30 years Part II: Contracting 6 - Contracting regimes for bus services: what have we learnt in recent years? 6.1 Background 6.2 Contract regimes: the case for negotiation 6.3 Contract completeness: why trust is fundamental 6.4 Building trust through partnership 6.5 Tactical level planning: the foundation for unleashing value for money 6.6 Conclusions 7 - Incompleteness and clarity in bus contracts 7.1 Introduction 7.2 A framework in which to identify contract incompleteness and clarity1 7.3 Empirical application 7.4 Empirical analysis 7.5 Conclusions 8 - A simplified performance-linked value for money model for bus contract payments 8.1 Background 8.2 A proposed simplified performance-linked payment (SPLP) model 8.3 Establishing benchmark value for money outcomes 8.4 Using the benchmark value for money outcomes 8.5 Conclusions 9 - Bus contract costs, user perceived service quality and performance assessment∗∗This is an adapted version fro ... 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Developing a service quality index 9.3 Results of the user preference model 9.4 The service quality index (SQI) 9.5 Linking service quality to cost and demand 9.6 The relationship between average cost per km and SQI 9.7 Determination of service performance standards and operator compliance 9.8 Conclusions 10 - Customer service quality and benchmarking in bus contracts 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concerns about traditional likert scale metrics of customer satisfaction 10.3 Developing a customer service quality index 10.4 The user preference model results 10.5 The customer service quality index (CSQI) and benchmarking 10.6 Conclusions Appendix Notation 11 - Are there cost efficiency gains through competitive tendering or negotiated performance-based contracts and benchmarking in ... 11.1 Introduction 11.2 A brief overview of negotiated performance-based contracts and competitive tendering 11.3 Approach to establishing benchmarked cost efficiency 11.4 A comparative assessment of NPBC and CT in Australia 11.5 Conclusions 12 - Efficient contracting and incentive agreements: the influence of risk preferences of contracting agents on contract choice 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Contract theory 12.3 Efficient contracting 12.3.1 The output that the principal cares about can be easily described 12.3.2 The agent has considerable discretion in their actions 12.3.3 The agent owns assets 12.3.4 Why are performance-based contracts so rare? 12.4 Using choice experiments as a way of empirically investigating contract preferences 12.5 Designing the choice experiments for contract assessment 12.5.1 The choice experiment 12.5.2 The experiment and the sample 12.5.3 Model estimation form 12.5.4 Model results 12.5.5 A simple application formula 12.6 Conclusions Appendix A. The experimental design of PT contract preferences 13 - Using contracted assets to undertake non-contracted services to improve cost efficiency∗ 13.1 Introduction and background 13.2 A case study 13.3 Conclusions 14 - Disruption costs in bus contract transitions 14.1 Introduction 14.2 Accounting for reputational risk in the assessment of contracting offers 14.3 The mixed logit model 14.4 Development of the sample and the survey instrument 14.5 Descriptive profile of sample 14.6 Key findings 14.7 Conclusions and implications Appendix 14.A: Background questions Part III: Bus rapid transit 15 - Sustainable bus systems: moving towards a value for money and network-based approach and away from blind commitment 15.1 Introduction 15.2 The appeal of BRT 15.3 Conclusions Appendix 16 - Ridership drivers of bus based transit systems∗∗Adapted by permission from Springer. Previous source of publi ... 16.1 Introduction 16.2 Data 16.3 Methodology 16.4 Sources of systematic variation in BRT ridership 16.5 Conclusions Appendix 16.A: descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for variables in Table 16.2 Appendix 16.B: random effects ridership regression model with GDP per capita and population density 17 - Performance contributors of bus rapid transit systems within the ITDP BRT standard 17.1 Introduction 17.2 The ITDP approach 17.3 The ordered choice model 17.4 Data 17.5 Revealed predictors of the BRT standard 17.6 Applications: business-as-usual projection and what-if analysis 17.7 Conclusions 18 - Review of bus rapid transit and branded bus service performance in Australia 18.1 The BRT debate: what happened? 18.2 An overview of BRT and BBS in Australia3 18.3 Gross performance comparison 18.4 Rationale for normalisation 18.5 Net performance comparison 18.6 Discussions and conclusions Appendix: included routes in each service cluster Acknowledgements Part IV: Image 19 - Identifying resident preferences for bus and rail investments 19.1 Introduction 19.2 Drivers of community preferences for public transport 19.3 Overview of the random regret mixed logit model 19.4 Empirical study 19.5 Model results 19.6 Application to project planning 19.6.1 Elasticities 19.6.2 The resident preference model 19.7 Conclusions and synthesis 20 - Cultural contrasts of preferences for bus rapid transit and light rail transit∗∗This is an adapted version fr ... 20.1 Introduction 20.2 Literature review 20.3 The choice experiment 20.4 The samples and sources 20.5 Descriptive profile of sample 20.6 The mode preference model form 20.7 Model results 20.8 Willingness to pay 20.9 Community preference model: simulated scenarios 20.10 Conclusions Appendix 20.A #251,0,-92Part V: Elasticities 21 - Assessing sources of variation in public transport elasticities: some warnings 21.1 Introduction 21.2 The data source 21.3 The evidence 21.4 Conclusions Appendix 21.A profile of data by elasticity type Appendix 21.B Key data sources Part VI: Crowding 22 - A review of willingness to pay evidence on public transport crowding 22.1 Introduction 22.2 Valuation of in-vehicle crowding 22.2.1 Time multiplier 22.2.2 Monetary value ($) per minute or hour 22.2.3 Monetary value ($) per trip 22.3 Valuation of crowding in access-ways and platforms 22.4 Synthesis of WTP estimates 22.5 Conclusions and policy implications 23 - A review of objective and subjective measures of crowding in public transport∗∗Previous source of publication ... 23.1 Introduction 23.2 Measures of crowding 23.2.1 Conventional bus and bus rapid transit (BRT) 23.2.2 Measures of crowding: passenger train 23.2.2.1 Rail crowding measures in the UK 23.2.2.2 Rail crowding measures in the USA 23.2.2.3 Rail crowding measures in Australia 23.3 Monitored crowding vs. experienced crowding: evidence from Melbourne and Sydney 23.4 Subjective or psychological components of crowding 23.5 Linking subjective and objective measures to measurable users benefits for inclusion in benefit-cost analysis 23.6 Conclusions and recommendations Appendix 23.A: Measuring subjective evaluations of crowding or perceived crowdedness (Mohd Mahudin et al., 2012) 24 - The effects of passenger crowding on public transport demand and supply 24.1 Introduction 24.2 Effects of passenger density and crowding 24.2.1 Effect on in-vehicle time 24.2.2 Effect on waiting time 24.2.3 Effect on travel time reliability 24.2.4 Effect on wellbeing 24.2.5 Effect on the valuation of travel time savings 24.2.6 Effect on route and bus choice 24.2.7 Effect on optimal public transport supply and fare 24.3 Estimation of crowding and standing costs 24.4 Effect of crowding disutility on demand estimation 24.5 Summary and conclusions 25 - Multimodal transport pricing with extensions to non-motorised transport∗∗This is an adapted version from the ... 25.1 Introduction 25.2 Setting public transport fares: first best and second best models 25.2.1 First best pricing 25.2.2 Second best pricing 25.2.3 Issues that arise when subsidising public transport 25.3 Results that matter 25.3.1 Optimal frequency and capacity 25.3.2 When the capacity constraint is binding 25.3.3 The effect of including other externalities beyond congestion 25.3.4 Dedicated bus lanes 25.3.5 Interactions with other sectors of the economy 25.3.6 Effects of bus congestion and congestion interactions 25.3.7 Non-motorised transport 25.4 A three-mode pricing model 25.4.1 Introduction 25.4.2 Model assumptions 25.4.3 First best pricing 25.4.4 Second best pricing 25.4.5 Extensions: other external costs and collection costs 25.5 Summary and conclusions Appendix Part VII: Transport appraisal 26 - Estimating the wider economic benefits of the Sydney North West Rail Link project 26.1 Introduction 26.2 Welfare benefits 26.2.1 Agglomeration economies 26.2.1.1 How a transport project affects agglomeration 26.2.1.2 Measurement of agglomeration economies 26.2.1.2.1 Travel zone 26.2.1.2.2 GDP and employment 26.2.1.3 Estimating changes of effective employment density due to a transport project 26.2.1.4 Elasticity of productivity with respect to effective employment density 26.2.1.5 Negative agglomeration economies 26.2.2 Increased output in imperfectly-competitive markets 26.2.3 Welfare benefits arising from improved labour supply 26.3 GDP impacts 26.3.1 More people choose to work due to changes in effective wages 26.3.2 Some people choose to work longer hours 26.3.3 Move to higher productive jobs 26.3.4 Summary of the main assumptions 26.4 Case study - North West Rail Link 26.4.1 Define the base case and project case 26.4.2 Input data 26.4.2.1 Local economic indicators 26.4.2.2 Travel time and cost 26.4.2.2.1 Annual travel expansion 26.4.2.2.2 Generalised travel time 26.4.2.2.3 Generalised travel cost 26.4.3 Estimating the WEB welfare benefits 26.4.3.1 Benefits of agglomeration (WB1) 26.4.3.1.1 Effective employment density 26.4.3.1.2 Agglomeration benefits 26.4.3.2 Benefits of the outputs from business travel time savings (WB2) 26.4.3.3 Welfare impacts from increased labour supply (WB3) 26.4.4 Estimation of the GDP impacts 26.4.4.1 Agglomeration economies (GI1) 26.4.4.2 Business travel time savings (GI2) 26.4.4.3 More people choose to work (GI3) 26.4.4.4 Some people choose to work longer hours (GI4) 26.4.4.5 Some people move to higher productive jobs (GI5) 26.4.5 Wider economic benefits results 26.4.6 Sensitivity tests of some assumptions 26.5 Concluding remarks 27 - Clarifying the complementary contributions of cost benefit analysis and economic impact analysis in public transport investment 27.1 Introduction 27.2 Requirements for decision support 27.3 Contrasting analysis methods 27.3.1 The time dimension (see Fig. 27.1, first box) 27.3.2 The spatial dimension (see Fig. 27.1, second box) 27.3.3 The impact element dimension (see Fig. 27.1, third box, and also Fig. 27.2) 27.4 Matching analysis methods to the context of decisions 27.5 The bus rapid transit (BRT) case study and its evaluation process 27.5.1 The bus rapid transit case 27.5.2 Application of the TREDIS framework 27.6 Analysis results 27.6.1 Cost-benefit analysis 27.6.2 Economic impacts across time 27.6.3 Spatial pattern of economic impacts 27.6.4 Economic impacts across sectors of the economy 27.7 Discussion 27.7.1 Wider perspectives 27.7.2 Critical elements of investment 27.8 Conclusion 28 - How well does BRT perform in contrast to LRT? An Australian case study∗∗This is an adapted version from the o ... 28.1 Introduction 28.2 The context for MetroScan's role 28.3 Case study: bus rapid transit and light rail transit 28.4 Benefit - cost and economic impact analyses 28.5 Economic impact analysis 28.6 Conclusions Appendix Part VIII: Energy 29 -Can bus be cleaner and greener than rail? 29.1 Introduction 29.2 Gathering the evidence on environmental advantage 29.3 The results of environmental advantage 29.4 Conclusions Part-IX: Social exclusion 30 - The roles of mobility and bridging social capital in reducing social exclusion in regional Australia 30.1 Introduction 30.2 Some concepts and definitions 30.3 Key literature on regional mobility/accessibility and social exclusion 30.4 Data analysis 30.4.1 Method and data description 30.4.2 Modelling and discussion 30.5 Discussion 30.6 Conclusions Part X: Mobility as a Service (MaaS) 31 - Future bus transport contracts under a mobility as a service regime 31.1 Introduction 31.2 A brief overview of MaaS in practice 31.3 What might MaaS mean for future bus contracts? 31.4 Future service delivery options in the new digital age 31.5 Links to reducing traffic congestion and scalability 31.6 Conclusions 32 - Potential uptake and willingness-to-pay for mobility as a service 32.1 Introduction 32.2 Literature on MaaS 32.3 The choice experiment survey 32.4 Sampling and sample profile 32.5 Descriptive analysis and model specification 32.5.1 Descriptive analysis 32.5.2 Model specification 32.6 Estimation results and willingness-to-pay for MaaS 32.7 Conclusions and ongoing research 33 - Identifying broker/aggregator models for delivering mobility as a service 33.1 Introduction 33.2 Delivering mobility as a service 33.2.1 Recent developments in urban passenger transport 33.2.2 Defining the broker: new business models 33.2.3 Situating the broker: mode-agnostic mobility contracts 33.3 Methodology 33.4 Mobility contract design 33.4.1 Mobility offering (revenue mix) 33.4.2 Government support 33.4.3 Return on investment 33.4.4 Business branding 33.4.5 Equity contribution 33.5 The survey instrument 33.5.1 Choice tasks and choice responses 33.5.2 Contextual variables and survey structure 33.5.3 Candidate respondents 33.6 Preliminary results 33.7 Conclusion and next steps Appendix 34 - What might road congestion look like in the future under a collaborative and connected mobility model? 34.1 Introduction 34.2 Smart shared mobility and potential implications for levels of congestion 34.3 The need for a governance framework to ensure smart mobility delivers congestion reduction 34.4 Data access and sharing - necessary to manage network congestion 34.5 Road pricing reform 34.6 Conclusions References Index A B C D E F G H I K L M N O P R S T U V W Back Cover