Two Rival Programmes in 19th Century Classical Electrodynamics: Action-At-A-Distance versus Field Theories

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cites [Duhem](https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/historians-miscellaneous-biographies/pierre-maurice-marie-duhem#1)'s [*Aim & Structure of Physical Theory*](https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=4506) and [*The Electric Theories of J. Clerk Maxwell: A Historical and Critical Study*](https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=4976)Frické defends O'Rahilly's "superior type of history" (p. & PDF p. 14), [*Electromagnetic Theory*](https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=3434).[Assis](https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_list&search=authors:%22%3DAssis%2C%20Andr%C3%A9%20K.%20T.%22) recommended in a 7/15/21, 11:49 AM emailing, and on 7/18/21, 6:20 AM: "this thesis is worth reading".cites Duhemian [Mary Hesse](https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=6727), toop. & PDF p.:19,21 (in § "3. The Philosophical Objection to A.A.D."): on ["describe" vs. "explain"](https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=2977): [Hospers (1956) "What is explanation?"](https://archive.org/details/essaysinconceptu0000flew/page/94/mode/2up)20: cites Aristotle, in the context of ressolving to first principle "essences" ("essentialism"), [∞ regress problem](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/38433/2014)90: PDF p. 5 of Jon Dorling, “[Demonstrative Induction: Its Significant Role in the History of Physics](https://isidore.co/misc/Physics%20papers%20and%20books/Zotero/storage/TPALPBGX/Dorling%20-%201973%20-%20Demonstrative%20Induction%20Its%20Significant%20Role%20in%20t.pdf),” *Philosophy of Science* 40, no. 3 (September 1, 1973): 360–72, gives "Demonstrative Induction" analysis of Ampère's discovery/invention of his force law, similar to Zabarella's *inductio demonstrativa* ([Wallace](https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=5302) p. 302) and "hypothetical-deductive (HD)" method?191: "Maxwell then tried to impose on the electromagnetic postulates a mechanical interpretation" ( *à le* Duhem's interpretation).*Quæritur* :Ampère made the explicit methodological distinction between “ *la synthèse indirecte* ” (the canonical hypothetico-deductive method) and “ *l’analyse directe* ” (typified by the Newtonian and Ampèrian way of deriving mathematically sound conclusions from the established premises of repeated observations/“conditions of experiments,” naturally re-translatable into demonstrative induction or “justification of a new fundamental hypothesis” from phenomena).The only places I've found Ampère using those terms are in * [Chemise 112 [carton 6], 1775-1836, p. 11](http://www.ampere.cnrs.fr/ice/ice_page_detail.php?lang=fr&type=img&bdd=koyre_ampere&table=ampere_mats&bookId=112&typeofbookDes=Manuscrits&pageOrder=11&facsimile=off&search=no)of a "Plan d'un cours sur la théorie de probabilités appliquée aux diverses branches des connaissances humaines": > Terminer le cours par l’examen des diverses méthodes. Savoir : > Synthèse directe quand le connu est plus simple que l’inconnu. Géométrie à posteriori > Analyse directe quand le connu est plus composé. > Analyse algébrique. Géométrie a priori. > Synthèse indirecte dans ce dernier cas lorsque la marche analytique ne peut s’y appliquer, comme dans plusieurs hypothèses explicatives. > Voir si l’analyse indirecte peut quelquefois s’appliquer. Très rare car qui déterminerait le choix à poser des conceptions très compliquées. [Analysis vs. synthesis has a confusing history](https://hsm.stackexchange.com/a/7001/232) (like "subjective" vs. "objective", a pet-peeve Deely frequently straightened out). Why would analysis = algebra, synthesis = geometry, and then analysis = infinitesimal calculus‽Answer:Chemise 112 [carton 6] only contains the text in which Ampère sums up his use of different ways of proceeding in laying out an argument to treat scientific and/or philosophical problems, comprising the distinction between “la synthèse indirecte” et “l’analyse directe,” and between “la synthèse directe” et “l’analyse indirecte.” But his actual detailed treatment of these is found in his *“Sur les quatre modes de raisonnement,”* archived in [Chemise 261 [carton 15],_pages 215 to 224, images 199 to 208](http://www.ampere.cnrs.fr/ice-manuscrits/ice_page_detail.php?lang=fr&type=img&bdd=koyre_ampere&table=ampere_mats&bookId=261&typeofbookDes=Manuscrits&pageOrder=199&facsimile=off&search=no&cfzoom=1.5). That is the text in which Ampère applies them, among other subject matters, to physical theories (illustrating how “l’analyse directe” works and is especially exemplified by Newton’s unification of gravity and astronomy “en raison inverse du carré des distances,” going from very complex phenomena to simple ideas). The overall Chemise contains his texts wherein he divides the subject matter of logic into different parts, treats of the distinction between “l’idée générale” et “l’idée spécifique,” between “propositions particulières” et “propositons universelles”, between “jugements analytiques” and “jugements synthétiques,” knowledge that can only be acquired by means of deduction, etc. Synthesis = geometry in Ampère’s epistemological classification, because “synthesis” is akin to moving from say simple but unclearly grasped axioms (as in Euclid’s *Elements* ) to complex (synthetic) but certain, established statements (comprising the demonstrated theorems, initially unknown, but now proved; and accordingly proved to be demonstrably more complicated than the given “known” axioms on starts with). Such definite and “synthetic knowledge” he elsewhere* precisely equates with [“certitude géométrique”](http://www.ampere.cnrs.fr/ice/ice_page_detail.php?lang=fr&type=img&bdd=koyre_ampere&table=ampere_mats&bookId=263&typeofbookDes=Manuscrits&pageOrder=8&facsimile=&search=no) (*in *“De l’espace et de l’immensité,”* archived in [Chemise 263 [carton 16]](http://www.ampere.cnrs.fr/ice/ice_page_detail.php?lang=fr&type=img&bdd=koyre_ampere&table=ampere_mats&bookId=263&typeofbookDes=Manuscrits&pageOrder=6&facsimile=&search=no)). Analysis = algebra, because “algebra” here is akin to a “simplification,” relative to the complexity one starts with (analysis moving in the epistemological direction opposite to synthesis, [“du complexe au simple”](http://www.ampere.cnrs.fr/ice-manuscrits/ice_page_detail.php?lang=fr&type=img&bdd=koyre_ampere&table=ampere_mats&bookId=261&typeofbookDes=Manuscrits&pageOrder=207&facsimile=off&search=no&cfzoom=1.5)).* * *The thesis is a historical case-study in which [I. Lakatos](https://isidore.co/misc/Res%20pro%20Deo/Encyclopedia%20of%20Philosophy%20\(Alcuin%20Books%20has%201st,%202%20vol.%20ed.%20of%20this\)/Lakatos_Imre_19221974.PDF)'s [*Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*](https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=8509) is applied to 19th. Century classical electrodynamics. Two research programmes are appraised. One, the Action-at-a-distance programme, had as its hard core the theory that electromagnetic phenomena were the outcome of sources acting at a distance across empty space on each other. Its rival, the Field programme, had the hard core that electromagnetic phenomena were the outcome of behaviour by the space between the apparent sources. **It is argued that the Action-at-a-distance programme was always the superior** one of the two. This revision in the standard historical appraisal results from the use of Lakatos's methodology. The Action-at-a-distance programme developed progressively, through the theories of Ampere, Weber, and their successors, to a satisfactory and fairly complete account of the phenomena of electrodynamics. In contrast, the Field programme degenerated as it consisted of a sequence of *ad hoc* or heuristically *ad hoc* theories. Faraday, Maxwell, and Helmholtz vigorously criticised the Action-at-a-distance programme. These criticisms were extremely influential and some historians regard them as persuasive today. It is shown that these criticisms are entirely without merit and further that they could easily have been seen to be without merit at the time of their proposal. Finally, many subsidiary theses, advocated by writers in the history and philosophy of the development of classical electrodynamics, are critically assessed.