Naturalism and Protectionism in the Study of Religions

Description

How should we study religion? Must we be religious ourselves to truly understand it? Do we study religion to advance our knowledge, or should the study of religions help to reintroduce the sacred into our increasingly secularized world? Juraj Franek argues that the study of religion has long been split into two competing paradigms: reductive (naturalist) and non-reductive (protectionist). While the naturalistic approach seems to run the risk of explaining religious phenomena away, the protectionist approach appears to risk falling short of the methodological standards of modern science. Franek uses primary source material from Greek and Latin sources to show that both competing paradigms are traceable to Presocratic philosophy and early Christian literature. He presents the idea that naturalists are distant heirs, not only of the French Enlightenment, but also of the Ionian one. Likewise, he argues that protectionists owe much of their arguments and strategies, not only to Luther and the Reformation, but to the earliest Christian literature. This book analyses the conflict between reductive and non-reductive approach in the modern study of religions, and positions the Cognitive Science of Religion against a background of previous theories – ancient and modern – to demonstrate its importance for the revindication of the naturalist paradigm. Cover page Halftitle page Series page Title page Copyright page Contents Acknowledgements Abbreviations Image 1 Introduction: Methodological schism in the study of religions 2 Naturalistic paradigm: Critical reflexion of religion in Presocratic philosophy 2.1 Xenophanes 2.2 Democritus 2.3 Sisyphus- fragment 2.4 Prodicus 2.5 Conclusion: Main characteristics of the naturalistic paradigm 3 Protectionist paradigm: Early Christian literature between faith and reason 3.1 Faith and reason 3.2 Warrants of faith (1): Miracles 3.3 Warrants of faith (2): Moral superiority 3.4 Warrants of faith (3): divine inspiration 3.5 Warrants of faith (4): Prophecy 3.6 Warrants of faith (5): Tradition 3.7 Athens and Jerusalem 3.8 Protectionist paradigm and epistemic justification 4 Naturalism and protectionism in the study of religions (1): The beginnings 4.1 Naturalistic paradigm in the study of religions until 1945 4.2 Protectionist paradigm in the study of religions until 1945 5 Naturalism and protectionism in the study of religions (2): The rise and fall of phenomenology 5.1 The emergence of classical phenomenology 5.2 Phenomenology and its critics after 1945 5.3 Conclusion: Elimination of the naturalistic paradigm in the study of religions 6 Cognitive science of religion (1): Methodology 6.1 Methodological isolationism 6.2 Religion, morality and evolution 6.3 Selfish genes 6.4 Rediscovery of human nature 6.5 Methodological consilience 6.6 The return of naturalism 7 Cognitive science of religion (2): Terminology 7.1 On the advantage and disadvantage of definition for the life (of religious studies) 7.2 Definition of religion and CSR 7.3 Essentialism: Tylor–Durkheim dichotomy 7.4 ‘Naïve’ social constructionism 7.5 Power-based social constructionism 7.6 Cognitive definition of religion 7.7 Has the cognitive science of religion (re)defined ‘religion’? 8 Cognitive science of religion (3): Practical application 8.1 The Muse in Homer and Hesiod: Primary data 8.2 The interpretations of the invocations: Status Quaestionis 8.3 Cognitive approach to invocations 8.4 Conclusion 9 Conclusion: A return of the prodigal son? Notes Editions References Index