Facts And Evidence: A Dialogue Between Philosophy And Law

Description

This book presents an in-depth discussion on two concepts from the field of philosophy and law, in order to improve our understanding of the relation between “fact” and “evidence” in judicial process. Since fact-finding is a difficult task for judges, proof by evidence has been devised to help them access the truth. However, in the process of judicial fact-finding, there is always a gap between fact and truth. This book covers a wide range of topics, from reflections on the concept of “fact,” “evidence” and “fact-finding” in the field of philosophy and law to individual case studies. As such it is a useful reference resource on the continuing research on the judicial proof process for students and scholars. Welcome Address......Page 5 Opening Remarks......Page 7 Contents......Page 9 Part IFacts and Evidence in Philosophical Epistemology......Page 11 Law and Philosophy in China and Elsewhere......Page 12 References......Page 22 Evidence and Facts: Dialogue Between Law and Philosophy......Page 24 References......Page 31 1 1......Page 32 2 2......Page 33 3 3......Page 35 4 4......Page 38 5 5......Page 39 References......Page 42 1 Introduction......Page 43 2.1 The Fact and Related Concepts......Page 44 2.3 Different Perspectives of Facts......Page 45 3.1 The Fact-Finding and Theories of Truth......Page 46 3.2 Competition Between Different Stories in Dialogical Argumentation......Page 48 4.1 Defeasible Epistemology and Evolutionary Cognition of Judicial Deduction......Page 49 4.2 Socially Constructed Truth......Page 50 5 Conclusion: Reflection on Criterion of Truth in the Fact-Finding......Page 51 Reference......Page 53 Providing Evidence: C.A. Coulomb’s “Balance Électrique” and the Culture of French Enlightened Rationality......Page 55 1 Rational Machines......Page 62 2 Conclusion......Page 65 Reference......Page 66 1 A Traditional Conceptual Model of Knowledge’s Nature......Page 68 2 Reinterpreting the Socratic Idea of a Tether......Page 70 3 Knowledge-Minimalism as an Explanatory Hypothesis......Page 75 4 Knowledge-Minimalism and Lucky Guesses......Page 77 5 Conclusion......Page 78 References......Page 79 1 Introduction......Page 80 2 The Performance Model Applied to Judgements in Legal Cases......Page 81 3 Epistemically Virtuous Agents......Page 83 References......Page 85 Facts as Evidence in Analytic Philosophy......Page 86 1 Historical Background......Page 87 2 Facts as Evidence in the Philosophy of Science......Page 88 3 A Wittgenstenian Approach......Page 90 References......Page 91 Part IIFacts and Evidence in Juridical Epistemology......Page 93 Truth, Justification, and Knowledge in the Epistemology of Adjudication......Page 94 1 Truth, Justification, and Knowledge......Page 95 2 Means and Ends: The Theoretical Primacy of Truth......Page 98 3 Epistemic Access to Truth: The Practical Primacy of Justification......Page 102 4 Knowledge and Luck......Page 106 5 Knowledge and the Epistemic Enterprise of Adjudication......Page 111 6 A Reconstruction of the Role of Knowledge in Adjudication......Page 115 7 Conclusion......Page 122 1 Facts......Page 123 2 Judicial Truths......Page 124 3 Which Truth......Page 127 4 Truth and Probability......Page 129 5 Evidence and Proof......Page 130 1 Fact......Page 133 1.1 The Reality of Fact......Page 134 1.2 The Empiricism of Fact......Page 135 1.3 The Narratability of Fact......Page 136 2.1 Three Patterns of Subjects’ Intervention in the Relationship Between Fact and Evidence......Page 138 2.2 The “Mirror of Evidence” Doctrine and Its Enlightenment......Page 140 3 Fact-Finding......Page 141 3.1 The Conceptual Basis of Courtroom Epistemology......Page 142 3.2 The Subjective Structure of Courtroom Epistemology and Its Dynamic Operation......Page 143 3.3 The Logical Structure and Process of Fact-Finding......Page 145 3.4 The Probability of Fact-Finding......Page 147 References......Page 150 2 Why Must Legal Fact Be Argued?......Page 151 3 The Structure of the Litigation Argumentation......Page 154 4 S-Fact Argumentation......Page 156 5 R-Fact Argumentation......Page 159 6 T-Fact Argumentation......Page 160 7 Conclusion......Page 164 References......Page 165 1 Distance Between Evidence and Fact......Page 166 1.1 The Evidence of Yingjie CUI Case and Its Implied Information......Page 167 1.2 Transformation from Evidence to Fact......Page 173 2.1 General Cognitive Approach......Page 179 2.2 Confused and Fallacious Inference......Page 182 3.1 A Brief Introduction to Story Model: Story Comes Before Evidence......Page 186 3.2 Analyze the Evidence Cognition of Yingjie CUI Case Through Story Model......Page 188 References......Page 193 Epistemological Limitations on Probabilistic Evidence Theory......Page 194 1.1 Used in People v. Collins & Bribery Case of Former President of Nanchang University......Page 195 1.2 Fundamental Incompatibilities with Fact-Findings......Page 196 2.1 Limitations on Understanding of Relationship......Page 198 2.2 Limitations on Understanding of Proof Process......Page 203 2.3 Limitation on Veritistic Rationale......Page 206 3.1 Epistemological Foundations Is in Flux......Page 208 3.2 Coherence Between Epistemology Core and Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE)......Page 209 References......Page 210 Part IIIFacts and Evidence in Criminal Trials......Page 212 1 Introduction......Page 213 2 Confessions and the Search for Truth......Page 214 3 The Morality of Confessions......Page 217 4 The Political Significance of Confessions......Page 223 5 Conclusion......Page 226 References......Page 227 1 Introduction......Page 230 2 Objective Proof Standard......Page 231 2.1 Normalization of the Objective Standard of Proof......Page 232 2.2 Reflections on the Objective Standard of Proof......Page 235 3 The Introduction of the Subjective Proof Standard......Page 238 3.1 The Establishment of “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”......Page 239 3.2 The Original Meaning of “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”......Page 240 3.3 The Intent of the Introduction of Subjective Proof Request......Page 242 4.1 Whether the Subjective Standard Is Equal to Objective Standard......Page 244 4.2 Whether the Subjective Standard Is Lower Than the Objective Standard......Page 246 4.3 The Integration of the Subjective Standard and the Objective Standard......Page 247 4.4 External Constraints of Subjective Standard......Page 249 5 Conclusion......Page 250 References......Page 251 1 Introduction......Page 252 2 Miscarriage of Justice in Criminal Cases Indicated that the “Corroborative” Mode of Proof Is Facing Challenges in China......Page 254 3 Operational Mechanism of the “Corroborative” Mode: “Trojan Horse” in the Criminal Proof......Page 257 4 Solutions: Programmed Mode of Proof......Page 263 5 Conclusion......Page 267 References......Page 268 1 Introduction: Evidence and Fact Research Beginning with the Evidence Theories by Professor Twining......Page 271 2.2 Stages of Evidence Identification......Page 273 2.3 Distinguishing Between Evidence Identification and Evidence Explanation in Trial......Page 274 2.4 Limitations of Evidence Identification......Page 275 3.2 Stages of Investigation Fact Inquiry......Page 276 3.3 Distinguishing Between Fact Inquiry and Fact Selection in Trial......Page 278 4 Conclusion......Page 279 References......Page 280 1 Preface......Page 281 2.1 Fact Formation Mechanism Under the Investigation Centrism......Page 284 2.2 Change of Fact Formation Mechanism Under Trial Centrism......Page 287 3 From the Objective Verification to the Subjective Evaluation......Page 290 3.1 Objective Verification Under Investigative Centralism......Page 291 3.2 Under Trial Centrism, the Regression of Subjective Evaluation......Page 294 4.1 The Unified Standard of Proof and Criticism Under Investigation Centralism......Page 299 4.2 The Establishment and Perfection of the Level of Evidence Requirements Under the Trial Centralism......Page 303 5 Conclusion: Realizing the Legitimacy of the Judgment Through the Proof Standard......Page 310 References......Page 311 1 Foreword......Page 312 2 Differences Between the Chinese Standard of Criminal Proof and Those of Western Countries......Page 313 3 Misuse of Skepticism About the Self-Explanatoriness of the Subjects of Cognition......Page 314 4 Misuse of Dualism of Subject and Object......Page 315 5 Misuse of Theories About Fragmentary Cognition and Ambiguity of Facts......Page 316 7 Confusion Between Facts and Values and Misuse of Theories on the Subjectivity of Values......Page 317 8 Misuse of the Probability of Inferential Propositions......Page 318 9 Misuse of Other Philosophical Theories......Page 319 10 Conclusion: New Issues Needed to Be Studied......Page 320 References......Page 321