Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics

Description

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy. Cover Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 5 Copyright Contents Acknowledgments List of Contributors Introduction References Chapter 1: The Asymmetry of Good and Evil 1. On Actions and Their Effects Options Acts or Deeds Actions or Doings 2. Doing Good Disposition-Independent and Disposition-Dependent Benefits Respect Love and Friendship Honesty, Justice, and other Virtues 3. Doing Evil Do Evildoers Exercise Malevolent, Self-sacrificing Control? Answer: Not in General, Only in Exceptional Cases 4. Explaining the Asymmetry Between Good and Doing Evil The Role of Standards Historical Antecedents 5. The Knobe Effect Acknowledgments References Chapter 2: A Particularist but Codifiable Virtue Ethics 1. Introduction 2. The Virtue Rules 3. A Target-Centered Virtue Ethical Notion of Right Action 4. The Thick Concepts, V-Reasons, and V-Acts 5. V-Rules Codify Default Reasons 6. The V-Rules, Particularism, and Codifiability 7. The Burden of Proof 8. Conclusion Acknowledgments References Chapter 3: My Welfare and Yours I II III IV V Acknowledgments Chapter 4: Moral Worth and Normative Ethics General Implications Altruism Misguided Altruistic Actions and Types of Reasons References Chapter 5: Ideas of the Good in Moral and Political Philosophy Introduction Sidgwick´s Dualism of Practical Reason Marx, Rawls, and Williams on Acceptance Answering the Question of Acceptance Acknowledgments Chapter 6: Scrupulous Judgments The Issue What Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Is What Scrupulosity Is Abnormality Charity Anxious Morality Concluding Thoughts Chapter 7: Obligations of Gratitude and Correlative Rights 1. The Obligation Platitude 2. The Directionality Platitude 3. The No-Right Platitude 4. Correlativity Reconsidered Acknowledgments Chapter 8: Moral Anxiety and Moral Agency 1. Varieties of Anxiety 2. Social Anxiety as Template 3. Moral Anxiety: What it is and What it Does 3.1 The Basic Model 3.2 Moral Anxiety as Distinct 4. Moral Anxiety, Deliberative Virtue, and Agency 4.1 Premise 2: Moral Decision Making and Moral Metacognition 4.2 Premise 3: Moral Anxiety and Moral Metacognition 4.3 Premise 5: Moral Anxiety Contributes Productively 4.4 The Pay-Off: Moral Anxiety as an Emotion to Cultivate 5. Three Implications 5.1 Cultivation 5.2 The Significance of Psychological Conflict 5.3 A Challenge to Existing Accounts 6. Conclusion Acknowledgments References Chapter 9: The Narrative Calculus 1. From Temporal Distribution to Narrative Shape 2. A Narrative Calculus What Is a Narrative? When Is a Story Prudentially Good? Progressivism vs. Achievementism 3. Testing the Theory 4. Objections 5. Conclusion References Chapter 10: Morality Within the Realm of the Morally Permissible 0. Introduction 1. Is There a Non-Trivial Realm of Moral Permissibility? 2. What is the Relationship Between Moral Permissibility and All-Things-Considered Permissibility? 3. Morally Permissible Moral Mistakes 4. Rejecting Morality Within the Realm of the Morally Permissible 5. Other Moral Categories 6. Conclusion Acknowledgments Chapter 11: Fairness, Participation, and the Real Problem of Collective Harm 1. Introduction 2. Two Examples 3. Weak Participation 4. Strong Participation 5. The Fairness Approach 6. Fairness and Difference-Making 7. A Common Problem 8. Can´t We Just Apply a Non-Consequentialist Theory and Call it a Day? 9. The Problem of Collective Harm (and How To Solve It) Acknowledgments Chapter 12: The Virtue of Authenticity 1. Introduction 2. Three Popular Conceptions of Authenticity 3. Refining the Three Popular Conceptions of Authenticity 4. Authenticity as A Personal Virtue 5. Summary Acknowledgments References Chapter 13: What Normative Terms Mean and Why It Matters for Ethical Theory 1 Introduction 2 Weak and Strong Necessity 3 Endorsing and Non-Endorsing Uses 4 Dilemmas 5 Supererogation 6 Judgment Internalism and ``The Normative´´ 7 Conclusion Acknowledgments References Index