ENGLISH

Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate

By Dan S. Felsenthal , Hannu Nurmi (auth.)

Book information

Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Year
2017
ISBN
978-3-319-51060-6, 978-3-319-51061-3
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-51061-3
Language
english
Format
PDF
Filesize
1 MB (1254785 bytes)
Series
SpringerBriefs in Economics
Edition
1
Pages
VIII, 88\97
Time added
2017-04-19 23:42:45
Political Economy;Social Choice/Welfare Economics/

Description

This book provides an evaluation of 18 voting procedures in terms of the most important monotonicity-related criteria in fixed and variable electorates. All voting procedures studied aim at electing one out of several candidates given the voters' preferences over the candidates. In addition to (strict) monotonicity failures, the vulnerability of the procedures to variation of the no-show paradoxes is discussed. All vulnerabilities are exemplified and explained. The occurrence of the no-show paradoxes is related to the presence or absence of a Condorcet winner. The primary readership of this book are scholars and students in the area of social choice.

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