Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain: An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes

Description

This book deals with 20 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain, viz., when a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile. Together with the two companion volumes by the same authors, published by Springer in 2017 and 2018, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of voting procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes. Front Matter ....Pages i-x Introduction (Dan S. Felsentha, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 1-4 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 5-16 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 17-40 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 41-49 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 51-65 Which of 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain? (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 67-74 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 75-87 Summary (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 89-92