Pyrrhonism Past and Present: Inquiry, Disagreement, Self-Knowledge, and Rationality

Description

This book explores the nature and significance of Pyrrhonism, the most prominent and influential form of skepticism in Western philosophy. Not only did Pyrrhonism play an important part in the philosophical scene of the Hellenistic and Imperial age, but it also had a tremendous impact on Renaissance and modern philosophy and continues to be a topic of lively discussion among both scholars of ancient philosophy and epistemologists. The focus and inspiration of the book is the brand of Pyrrhonism expounded in the extant works of Sextus Empiricus. Its aim is twofold: to offer a critical interpretation of some of the central aspects of Sextus’s skeptical outlook and to examine certain debates in contemporary philosophy from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective. The first part explores the aim of skeptical inquiry, the defining features of Pyrrhonian argumentation, the epistemic challenge posed by the Modes of Agrippa, and the Pyrrhonist’s stance on the requirements of rationality. The second part focuses on present-day discussions of the epistemic significance of disagreement, the limits of self-knowledge, and the nature of rationality. The book will appeal to researchers and graduate students interested in skepticism. Preface Contents Chapter 1: The Motivation, the Approach, the Plan 1.1 Skepticism and Psychological Constitution 1.2 Taking Skepticism Seriously 1.3 Aims and Approach 1.4 Layout of the Book References Part I: Pyrrhonism Past Chapter 2: Pyrrhonian Inquiry 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Skeptic as Inquirer 2.3 Can the Skeptic Search for Truth? 2.4 Conclusion References Chapter 3: Argumentation and Persuasiveness 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Argumentative Therapy 3.3 Truth-Directed Inquiry 3.4 Two Kinds of Persuasiveness 3.5 Conclusion References Chapter 4: The Agrippan Modes and the Challenge of Disagreement 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Five Modes 4.3 Ad Hominem Argumentation and Non-doxastic Assent 4.4 Questionable Assumptions 4.5 The Argument from Possible Disagreement 4.6 Conclusion References Chapter 5: Pyrrhonian Rationality 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Versions of the LNC 5.3 The Skeptic’s Alleged Commitment to the LNC 5.4 The Skeptic’s Suspension About the LNC 5.5 The Skeptic’s Observance of the LNC 5.6 Suspension as a Psychological Reaction 5.7 The Skeptic’s Use of Reason 5.8 Conclusion References Part II: Pyrrhonism Present Chapter 6: The Epistemology of Disagreement 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Overview of the Debate 6.3 Factualism 6.4 Evidence 6.5 Evidence Assessment, First-Person Perspective, and Self-Trust 6.6 Conclusion References Chapter 7: Personal Information as Symmetry Breaker 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Personal Information and High Degree of Justified Confidence 7.3 Real-Life Disputes and Unpossessed Information 7.4 Conclusion References Chapter 8: The Limits of Self-Knowledge 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Overconfidence 8.3 The Bias Blind Spot 8.4 Self-Knowledge Through Introspection 8.5 Confabulation 8.6 Objections and Replies 8.7 Conclusion Appendix: Sextus and Galen on the Pyrrhonist’s Knowledge of His Own Affections References Chapter 9: The Disagreeing About Disagreement Argument 9.1 Introduction 9.2 The Self-Defeat Charge 9.3 Conciliationist Replies to the DDA 9.4 A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response 9.5 Objections and Replies 9.6 Conclusion References Chapter 10: The Nature of Rationality 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Conceptions of Rationality and the “Why Be Rational?” Question 10.3 Is the Neo-Pyrrhonist (Ir)rational? 10.4 LNC, Modus Ponens, and Modus Tollens 10.5 Conclusion References Chapter 11: Coda 11.1 Summary 11.2 Does Pyrrhonism Have Epistemic or Prudential Value? Reference Bibliography I. Editions and Translations II. Secondary Literature Index Locorum Name Index Subject Index