Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning

Description

Cover; Title Page; Original Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Table of Contents; Preface; CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION; Need for a Systematic Study; Aristotle's Topics; Informal Fallacies; How are Schemes Normatively Binding?; Practical Reasoning; Plausible Reasoning; Argumentation Schemes and Themes; CHAPTER TWO: PRE SUMPTIVE REASONING; Received Views of Presumption; Introduction to Nonmonotonic Reasoning; Burden of Proof; Commitment and Burden Shifting; Speech Act Conditions Defining Presumption; Presumptions and Presuppositions; Testimony, Presumption and Fallacies.;Recent concerns with the evaluation of argumentation in informal logic and speech communication center around nondemonstrative arguments that lead to tentative or defeasible conclusions based on a balance of considerations. Such arguments do not appear to have structures of the kind traditionally identified with deductive and inductive reasoning, but are extremely common and are often called ""plausible"" or ""presumptive, "" meaning that they are only provisionally acceptable even when they are correct. How is one to judge, by some clearly defined standard, whether such arguments are correct o. Cover Title Page Original Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Table of Contents Preface CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION Need for a Systematic Study Aristotle's Topics Informal Fallacies How are Schemes Normatively Binding? Practical Reasoning Plausible Reasoning Argumentation Schemes and Themes CHAPTER TWO: PRE SUMPTIVE REASONING Received Views of Presumption Introduction to Nonmonotonic Reasoning Burden of Proof Commitment and Burden Shifting Speech Act Conditions Defining Presumption Presumptions and Presuppositions Testimony, Presumption and Fallacies. Introduction to the Fallacy of Secundum QuidThe Practical Nature of Presumption Implications for Argumentation and Fallacies CHAPTER THREE: THE ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES Argument from Sign Argument from Example Argument from Verbal Classification Argument from Commitment Circumstantial Argument Against the Person Argument from Position to Know Argument from Expert Opinion Argument from Evidence to a Hypothesis Argument from Correlation to Cause Argument from Cause to Effect Argument from Consequences Argument from Analogy Argument from Waste Argument from Popularity. Ethotic ArgumentArgument from Bias Argument from an Established Rule Argument from Precedent Argument from Gradualism The Causal Slippery Slope Argument The Precedent Slippery Slope Argument Argument from Vagueness of a Verbal Classification Argument from Arbitrariness of a Verbal Classification The Verbal Slippery Slope Argument The Full Slippery Slope Argument CHAPTER FOUR: ARGUMENT FROM IGNORANCE Four Cases Argument from Ignorance as Presumptive Reasoning 1 Contexts of Dialogue A Reasonable Kind of Argument What Counts as an Argument from Ignorance? The Negative Logic of Argumentum ad I gnorantiamWhen is it Fallacious? Related Fallacies Fallacies and Blunders Concluding Remarks CHAPTER FIVE: IGNORING QUALIFICATIONS Terminology and Classification Accident and Converse Accident The Raw Meat Example Aristotle's Account Historical Developments Nonmonotonic Reasoning Again A Model Treatment Dynamic Reasoning Protagorean Relativism Conclusions CHAPTER SIX: ARGUMENT FROM CONSEQUENCES The Claim that it is Fallacious Views of the Amsterdam School Practical and Discursive Reasoning. Pragma-dialectical Nature of Argument from ConsequencesAppropriate Dialectical Situations Consequences of Putting Forward a Point of View Dialectical Structure of Argument from Consequences Subfallacies of Argumentum ad Consequentiam Related Fallacies The Project of Evaluation REFEREN C E S.