ENGLISH

Peirce’s Account of Assertion

By Jaime Alfaro Iglesias

Book information

Publisher
University of São Paulo
Year
2016
Language
english
Format
PDF
Filesize
959 kB (981880 bytes)
Pages
191\191
Time added
2016-09-18 02:39:56
AssertionC.S. PeircePhilosophy of Language

Description

C.S. Peirce held the view that to assert a proposition is to make onself responsible for its truth. This thesis interprets Peirce’s view of assertion and evaluates Peirce’s reasons for holding it. I begin by reconstructing and assessing Peirce’s case for such view as it appears in (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), and (CP 5.546, 1908). Then, I continue by elaborating on three aspects of Peirce’s view of assertion,namely, assertion as an act involving a certain kind of responsibility, the proposition as what is asserted, and responsibility for truth as a responsibility to give reasons. With respect to these three aspects, I argue for the following claims: (1) Peirce construed the responsibility involved in asserting as a moral responsibility; (2) Peirce held that propositions are types; and (3) Peirce was committed to a dialogical interpretation of “responsibility to give reasons”. Finally, I end by presenting two objections to Peirce’s view of assertion and its corresponding replies. I conclude that Peirce’s account of assertion is a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate on assertion.

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