Nonexistent Objects in Buddhist Philosophy: On Knowing What There is Not

Description

Can we know what there is not? This book examines the historical development of the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects in several major Buddhist philosophical schools. Beginning with a study of the historical development of the concept in Mahasamghika, Darstantika, Yogacara and Sautrantika, it evaluates how successfully they have argued against the extreme view of their main opponent the Sarvastivadins and established their view that one can know what there is not. It also includes thematic studies on the epistemological issues of nonexistence, discussing making sense of empty terms, controversies over negative judgments, and a proper classification of the conceptions of nothing or nonexistence. Taking a comparative approach to these topics, this book considers contemporary Western philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Meinong and Russell alongside representative figures of the Buddhist Pramana School. Based on first-hand study of primary sources in Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan, Nonexistent Objects in Buddhist Philosophy makes available the rich discussions and debates on the epistemological issues of nonexistence in Buddhist philosophy to students and researchers in Asian and comparative philosophy. Cover Half Title Series Title Copyright Contents Acknowledgments Introduction Part One Cognition of Nonexistent Objects: A Historical Development 1 Mahāsāṃghika 1.1 Latent Defilements without Objects 1.2 Awareness without Objects 1.3 Consciousness of the Past and the Future 1.4 Three Arguments Dārsṭạ̄ntika 2.1 Objects of Conjunction and Feeling 2.2 Illusions 2.3 Negative Expressions 2.4 Meditation of Nonexistent Objects 2.5 Four Arguments Yogācāra 3.1 “Mental Consciousness Takes Nonexistents as Objects” 3.2 The Past and the Future 3.3 Existents and Nonexistents 3.4 No-Self and Impermanence 3.5 Food and Drinks 3.6 Heretical Views 3.7 Five Arguments 4 Vasubandhu 4.1 Vaibha.ika Arguments for the Existence of the Past and the Future 4.2 Conditions of Cognition 4.3 Speaking of the Past and the Future 4.4 Cognition of the Past and the Future 4.5 Ontological Status of the Past and the Future 4.6 Absolute Nonexistence 4.7 Doubts 4.8 Six Arguments Part Two Epistemological Approaches to Nonexistence 5 Non-cognition 5.1 A Third Praman.a 5.2 Feiliang 5.3 Apraman.ata (Apraman.atva) 5.4 Non-cognition and Nonexistence 5.5 Non-cognition as the Third Praman.a 6 Empty Terms 6.1 “Primordial Matter Does Not Exist” 6.2 The Method of Paraphrase 6.3 The Principle of Conceptual Subjects 6.4 Two Types of Negation 6.5 The Principle of Propositional Attitude 7 Negative Judgments 7.1 How is a Negative Judgment Possible? 7.2 Negation is Secondary 8 Typology of Nothing 8.1 Original Nothing 8.2 Nothing 8.3 Emptiness 8.4 Why is there Something Rather than Nothing? Notes References Index