Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein: Seeing-As and Novelty

Description

This volume brings together new essays that consider Wittgenstein’s treatment of the phenomenon of aspect perception in relation to the broader idea of conceptual novelty; that is, the acquisition or creation of new concepts, and the application of an acquired understanding in unfamiliar or novel situations. Over the last twenty years, aspect perception has received increasing philosophical attention, largely related to applying Wittgenstein’s remarks on the phenomena of seeing-as, found in Part II of Philosophical Investigations (1953), to issues within philosophical aesthetics. Seeing-as, however, has come to occupy a broader conceptual category, particularly in philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology. The essays in this volume examine the exegetical issues arising within Wittgenstein studies, while also considering the broader utility and implications of the phenomenon of seeing-as in the fields of aesthetics, philosophical psychology, and philosophy of mathematics, with a thematic focus on questions of novelty and creativity. The collection constitutes a fruitful interpretative engagement with the later Wittgenstein, as well as a unique contribution to considerations of philosophical methodology. About the Author Michael Beaney is Professor of Philosophy at the University of York. He is Editor of The British Journal for the History of Philosophy. Brendan Harrington holds a doctorate in Philosophy from the University of York (UK), and currently manages and facilitates group work within various mental health units of the UK prison system. Dominic Shaw holds a doctorate in Philosophy from the University of York (UK).