E-Physicalism: A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness

Description

This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with original causal powers, with respect to the micro-constituents of the conscious entity. Fifthly, he addresses the “zombie argument” and the “supervenience argument” within the e-physicalism framework. Finally, he elaborates on the claim that phenomenal properties are physical and discusses the “knowledge argument”. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1: A PHYSICALIST APPROACH TO CONSCIOUSNESS 1.0 Introduction 1.1 Consciousness and “what it is like” 1.2 Realism about consciousness 1.2.1 Eliminativism 1.2.2 The problem of consciousness 1.3 Physicalism about consciousness 1.3.1 Physical items 1.3.2 Supervenience 1.4 The mind/body duality 1.5 Minds and bodies 1.5.1 Mind-body causal relations 1.5.2 Epiphenomenalism 1.5.3 Monism 1.6 Panpsychism 1.6.1 The combination problem 1.6.2 Panpsychism and neuroscience 1.7 Conclusion CHAPTER 2: STRONG AI AND COMPUTATIONALISM 2.0 Introduction 2.1 Strong AI 2.1.1 Conscious behaviour 2.1.2 Consciousness and behaviour 2.2 Computational functionalism 2.2.1 Functionalism and consciousness 2.2.2 Functions and information 2.3 The internal character of consciousness 2.4 Conclusion CHAPTER 3: SUBJECTIVITY AND THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 3.0 Introduction 3.1 Higher-order representation theories of consciousness 3.2 The unity of consciousness 3.3 The explanatory gap 3.3.1 Subjectivity and reality 3.3.2 Intersubjective accessibility 3.4 The homunculus fallacy 3.5 Conclusion CHAPTER 4: SUPERVENIENCE, EMERGENCE, AND ONTOLOGICAL NOVELTY 4.0 Introduction 4.1 Supervenience and ontology 4.2 Consciousness and supervenience 4.3 Microphysicalism 4.4 The levels of reality 4.5 Emergence 4.6 The case for emergence 4.6.1 The kinetic theory of gases 4.6.2 The EPR Paradox and Bell’s theorem 4.6.3 Microphysicalism and nonlocality 4.7 Emergence laws 4.8 Conclusion CHAPTER 5: E-PHYSICALISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS 5.0 Introduction 5.1 Experiencers 5.2 The possible worlds strategy 5.2.1 Physical and metaphysical possibility 5.2.2 The conceivability of possible worlds 5.3 Metaphysical zombies 5.4 Kim’s “supervenience argument” 5.5 Conclusion CHAPTER 6: E-PHYSICALISM AND PHENOMENAL QUALITIES 6.0 Introduction 6.1 Vehicles and content – an analogy 6.2 Phenomenal content and representational content 6.2.1 One vehicle, different contents 6.2.2 One content, different vehicles 6.2.3 Nonrepresentational phenomenal contents 6.3 Phenomenal character and physical states 6.3.1 Phenomenal character and biological functions 6.3.2 Phenomenal space 6.4 The knowledge argument 6.4.1 Mary does not acquire new knowledge 6.4.2 The ability hypothesis 6.4.3 The limits of scientific knowledge 6.5 Conclusion CONCLUSION REFERENCES