Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge

Description

From antiquity to the end of the twentieth century, philosophical discussions of understanding remained undeveloped, guided by a 'received view' that takes understanding to be nothing more than knowledge of an explanation. More recently, however, this received view has been criticized, and bold new philosophical proposals about understanding have emerged in its place. In this book, Kareem Khalifa argues that the received view should be revised but not abandoned. In doing so, he clarifies and answers the most central questions in this burgeoning field of philosophical research: what kinds of cognitive abilities are involved in understanding? What is the relationship between the understanding that explanations provide and the understanding that experts have of broader subject matters? Can there be understanding without explanation? How can one understand something on the basis of falsehoods? Is understanding a species of knowledge? What is the value of understanding?--  Read more... Machine generated contents note: 1. The Philosophy of Understanding -- 1.1. Kinds of Understanding -- 1.2. Degrees of Understanding -- 1.3. The Nexus Principle -- 1.4. The Scientific Knowledge Principle -- 1.5. The Explanation-Knowledge-Science (EKS) Model -- 1.6. The Received View of Understanding -- 1.7. A Look Ahead -- 2. An Illustration: Bjorken Scaling -- 2.1. Preliminaries and Clarifications -- 2.2. Bjorken on Scaling -- 2.3. A Lack of Understanding -- 2.4. Comparison with Batterman -- 2.5. Comparison with De Regt -- 2.6. Conclusion -- 3. Understanding and Ability -- 3.1. The Classic Ability Argument -- 3.2. Resisting the Classic Ability Argument -- 3.3. The Updated Ability Argument -- 3.4. Pritchard on Cognitive Achievements -- 3.5. Hills on Cognitive Control -- 3.6. Grimm on Grasping -- 3.7. Conclusion -- 4. Objectual Understanding -- 4.1. The Lay of the Land -- 4.2. Robust Breadth -- 4.3. Austere Breadth -- 4.4. Robust Coherence -- 4.5. Austere Coherence -- 4.6. Conclusion -- 5. Understanding Without Explanation? -- 5.1. Lipton's Framework -- 5.2. Putting Explanation Back into Understanding -- 5.3. Examples of Modal Understanding -- 5.4. The Galileo Example -- 5.5. Unification via Tacit Analogy -- 5.6. Tacit Understanding of Causes -- 5.7. Conclusion: A Rapprochement? -- 6. Understanding and True Belief -- 6.1. Getting Our Bearings -- 6.2. Historical Arguments -- 6.3. Idealization Arguments -- 6.4. Conclusion -- 7. Lucky Understanding -- 7.1. The Luck Questions -- 7.2. Passe Compatibilism -- 7.3. Nouveau Incompatibilism -- 7.4. Argumentum ex Scientia -- 7.5. Conclusion -- 7.6. Excursus: Gettier Luck -- 8. The Value of Understanding -- 8.1. The Basic Value Question -- 8.2. The Distinctive Value Question -- 8.3. Conclusion: Understanding, Philosophy, and Scientific Knowledge.