Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in 1929

Description

The book explores the impact of manuscript remarks during the year 1929 on the development of Wittgenstein’s thought. Although its intention is to put the focus specifically on the manuscripts, the book is not purely exegetical. The contributors generate important new insights for understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his place in the history of analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein’s writings from the years 1929-1930 are valuable, not simply because they marked Wittgenstein’s return to academic philosophy after a seven-year absence, but because these works indicate several changes in his philosophical thinking. The chapters in this volume clarify the significance of Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy in 1929. In Part 1, the contributors address different issues in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g. Wittgenstein's understanding of certain aspects of intuitionism and his commitment to verificationism, as well as his idea of "a new system". Part 2 examines Wittgenstein's philosophical development and his understanding of philosophical method. Here the contributors examine particular problems Wittgenstein dealt with in 1929, e.g. the colour-exclusion problem, and the use of thought experiments as well as his relationship to Frank Ramsey and philosophical pragmatism. Part 3 features essays on phenomenological language. These chapters address the role of spatial analogies and the structure of visual space. Finally, Part 4 includes one chapter on Wittgenstein’s few manuscript remarks about ethics and religion and relates it to his Lecture on Ethics. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in 1929 will be of great interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein and the history of analytic philosophy. Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents List of Contributors Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations Introduction: Wittgenstein in 1929 Notes References Part 1: Mathematics and Thinking the New Chapter 1: Wittgenstein’s Struggle with Intuitionism 1.1 Wittgenstein in 1929 1.2 The Tractatus: Arithmetic as Equations 1.3 The Priority of Mathematics over Logic 1.4 Weak Counterexamples and the Law of Excluded Middle 1.5 Toward a Better Understanding Notes References Chapter 2: The Origins of Wittgenstein’s Verificationism 2.1 Verificationism in the Tractatus 2.2 The Brouwer Lecture 2.3 The Origins of Verificationism in MSS 105–107 2.4 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 3: Searching in Space vs. Groping in the Dark: Wittgenstein on Novelty and Imagination in 1929–1930 3.1 Imagination, Creativity, and Novelty in Wittgenstein’s Work 3.2 Spatial Imagery 3.3 Synthetic A Priori Propositions 3.4 Searching for Spaces 3.5 Remarks on Ramsey Notes References Part 2: Method and Development Chapter 4: The Color-Exclusion Problem and the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Logic 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Tractatus on Logic: Key Commitments 4.3 The Color-Exclusion Problem as a Stimulus for Rethinking Logic 4.4 “What Becomes of Logic Now?” Notes References Chapter 5: What Would It Look Like? Wittgenstein’s Radical Thought Experiments 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Two Contexts, One Method 5.3 Visual Space and Absolute Directions: Life at the Telescope 5.4 No Subject: The Hanging Eyeball 5.5 What Would It Be Like: Your Tooth, My Pain? 5.6 The Despot and “I” 5.7 Moore’s Hinge Sentence and the Limits of Thought Notes References Chapter 6: Phenomenological Language: “Not Possible” or “Not Necessary”? 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Outlines of a Phenomenological Language 6.3 Phenomenological Language and Time 6.4 Once Again: A New Method of Logical Analysis Notes References Chapter 7: Hypotheses as Expectations: Ramsey and Wittgenstein 1929 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Ramsey and the Tractatus 7.3 Ramsey: Belief as Expectation 7.4 Wittgenstein’s Turn Away from the Picture Theory and Toward Hypotheses 7.5 Language Is Not Like a Calculus Notes References Part 3: Phenomenology and Visual Space Chapter 8: Simplicity in Wittgenstein’s 1929 Manuscripts 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Color-Exclusion 8.3 The 1929 Manuscripts and SRLF 8.4 Are There Any Simples at All in the Visual Field? 8.5 Wittgenstein on Nicod 8.6 Phenomenological Language: Nicod Again Notes References Chapter 9: Temptations of Purity: Phenomenological Language and Immediate Experience 9.1 Sketching the Itinerary 9.2 Departing from Ordinary Language 9.2.1 Ordinary Language Is “Physicalist” and “Hypothetical” 9.2.2 Ordinary Propositions as Multidimensional Hypotheses 9.2.3 Experienced Objects as Multifaceted Phenomena 9.3 Toward Phenomenological Language 9.3.1 Truth and Sense, Phenomenologically 9.3.2 Subtracting the Hypothetical: A Reduction, Linguistically 9.3.3 Isolating Sensory Fields: A Reduction, Experientially 9.4 Dead End: Back to Ordinary Language 9.4.1 Tests for Non-hypothetical Description: Biographical, Sculptural, and Cinematic 9.4.2 A Threat to Immediate Experience: The Metaphysics of Time 9.5 Openings Ahead Notes References Chapter 10: Speaking of the Given: The Structure of Visual Space and the Limits of Language 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Structural Differences between Visual Space and Language 10.2.1 The Hypothetical Character of Language 10.2.2 The Reality of Phenomena in Visual Space 10.3 Speaking of the Private: Grammatical Surfaces in the Language of Experience Notes References Part 4: Ethics Chapter 11: The Good, the Divine, and the Supernatural 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Logical Form 11.3 Ethics without Requirements Notes References Index