China's Strategic Multilateralism: Investing in Global Governance

Description

China sometimes plays a leadership role in addressing global challenges, but at other times it free rides or even spoils efforts at cooperation. When will rising powers like China help to build and maintain international regimes that sustain cooperation on important issues, and when will they play less constructive roles? This study argues that the strategic setting of a particular issue area has a strong influence on whether and how a rising power will contribute to global governance. Two strategic variables are especially important: the balance of outside options the rising power and established powers face, and whether contributions by the rising power are viewed as indispensable to regime success. Case studies of China's approach to security in Central Asia, nuclear proliferation, global financial governance, and climate change illustrate the logic of the theory, which has implications for contemporary issues such as China's growing role in development finance. Cover Half Title Title page Imprints page Contents Acknowledgments List of abbreviations 1 Introduction: Explaining China’s International Behavior 1.1 The Puzzle 1.2 The Argument in Brief 1.3 Plan for the Book 2 Theory: When Do Rising Powers Choose to Invest, Hold-Up, or Accept Existing Regime Arrangements? 2.1 International Regimes and Second­Order Cooperation 2.2 Outside Options and Indispensability 2.2.1 What States Want 2.2.2 Outside Options 2.2.3 Indispensability 2.2.4 Summary 2.3 Dynamic Conditions 2.4 Observation 3 The Context and Content of China’s Rise 3.1 China’s Economic Rise 3.2 Increases in China’s Strategic Capabilities 3.3 China’s Diplomatic “Going Out” 3.4 Turning Points: The Global Financial Crisis and US “Rebalance” 3.5 Conclusion 4 Order in Central Asia: From Accept to Invest 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Background: China, Central Asia, and the Problem of Stability in Xinjiang before the End of the Cold War 4.3 China and Central Asia in the 1990s: Worsening Outside Options 4.3.1 China’s Growing Stake in Central Asian Stability 4.3.2 The Declining Attractiveness of Russia’s Unilateral Option 4.3.3 Summary 4.4 Investing in Stability 4.4.1 The Shanghai Five 4.4.2 The Establishment of the SCO 4.4.3 Why Invest? 4.5 The Evolution of the SCO after 2001 4.5.1 Chinese Outside Options Relating to Central Asia after 2001 4.5.2 Continued (but Limited) Investment: China and the Evolution of the SCO after 2001 4.6 Conclusions 4.6.1 BRI and the Future of PRC Institution­building in Central Asia 5 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Accept, but Invest Selectively in the North Korea Issue 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The Overall Pattern of Acceptance 5.2.1 Chinese Behavior from the Late 1980s through Mid-1990s 5.2.2 Chinese Behavior from the Mid­1990s to the Present 5.3 North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Investing in the Six Party Talks 5.3.1 The First Nuclear Crisis (1993–1994) 5.3.2 The Second Nuclear Crisis and the Establishment of the 6PT (2003) 5.3.3 China’s Approach to the North Korean Nuclear Issue After the Six Party Talks 5.4 Conclusions 6 Global Financial Governance: From Accept to Hold-Up 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The Institutions of Global Financial Governance 6.3 China and the Institutions of Global Financial Governance through the Early 2000s: Accept 6.4 Mid-2000s through the Global Financial Crisis and After: The Move to Hold-Up 6.4.1 Case 1: IMF Vote Shares 6.4.2 Case 2: Inclusion of the RMB in the SDR Basket of Currencies 6.5 Conclusions on Chinese Hold­Up in Global Financial Governance 7 Climate Change Negotiations: From Hold-Up to Invest 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Background: Understanding the International Climate Arena and China’s Place in It 7.2.1 The UN Climate Regime: A Complex of Issues and Actors 7.3 China and Climate Negotiations from Bali to Copenhagen: Indispensability and Favorable Outside Options Lead to Hold-up 7.3.1 Negotiations in the Lead­up to Bali 7.3.2 The Bali Conference of the Parties Meetings, 2007 7.3.3 Hold-up at Copenhagen, 2009 7.4 Toward Invest: Worsening Outside Options and the Post­Copenhagen Negotiations 7.4.1 Copenhagen’s Immediate Aftermath and Evolving Steps toward a Xi–Obama Deal 7.4.2 Toward “Invest” 7.4.3 China’s Increased Stake 7.4.4 China’s Coalitional Options 7.5 Conclusion and Alternative Explanations on Constructing a Climate Change Agreement 8 Conclusions 8.1 Implications for the International Relations Literature 8.2 China Invests in Development Finance: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 8.3 Looking toward the Future: The Implications of Populist Nationalism in the United States and the European Union References Index