States, Civilisations and the Reset of World Order

Description

This book evaluates the current state of world (dis)order at a time of growing populism, nationalism and pandemic panic. It distils the implications of the ‘civilisational state’ for world order. The retreat of US leadership is mirrored by the decline of both the material and normative liberal multilateral infrastructure it supported. Meanwhile, the rise of China as a challenger is accompanied in political, economic and cultural terms by other emerging powers no longer bound to the norms of 20th century world affairs, notably Turkey, India, China and Russia. By emphasising a cultural lens of analysis alongside robust political and economic analysis, the author offers a prescriptive agenda for the coming post-pandemic age that recognises the changing powers of civilisational, state and hybrid non-state actors. Without overestimating their probabilities, he outlines prospects and preconditions for effective inter-civilisational dialogue and proposes a series of minimal conditions for a multilateral ‘reset’. This book will appeal to public and private decision-makers, the media, the educated lay public and civil society actors interested in the rise of civilisational politics and its possible consequences for world affairs. It will be of particular interest to students and researchers in the fields of politics, international relations, international political economy, geopolitics, strategic studies, foreign policy and social psychology. Cover Endorsement Half Title Series Information Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents Figures Preface Acknowledgements Introduction: States, Civilisations, Pandemics and Order The Structure of the Book Notes Part I States, Civilisations and World Order 1 Making Sense of Liberal International Order: Concepts and Context Conceptual Deck-Clearing: Order, Culture and Values Liberal Order and Beyond: the Argument in Brief A Little Bit of Economic Theory: Towards a New Mercantilism Notes 2 International Order, the US–China Relationship and Europe The Big Picture: Ideology Or Interest in the New Geopolitics? The US, China and the New Economic Warfare Coping With the Binary Divide: the EU and Its ‘Existential’ Crisis Conclusion: From Rules-Based Order to ‘Fight Club’? Notes 3 Civilisational States and Regions: Actors Beyond a Western Liberal Order Impressions of Civilisational States The Philosophical Roots of Chinese Thinking On International Order China, Cultural Values and a Multilateral World Putting Cultural Ideals Into Practice Civilisational Discourse in Russian Geopolitical Thinking Ideological Transformation in the 20th Century and Its Influence On Russian Foreign Policy Russia in the 21st Century: Once Again Between West and East Turkey: a Europe–Asia Pivot? India: an Emerging Great Power? Hierarchical Relations in Southeast Asia Towards Eurasia? Notes 4 Challenges for World Order: Development, Ecology and Pandemics Development, Ecology and the Environment COVID-19 and Beyond: Pandemics and Global Order A Further Look at the US–China Relationship: the COVID-19 Factor Notes Part II A Post Pandemic World Order: Towards a Reset? 5 Civilisational Dialogue as a Vehicle for Reforming World Order: Can the Liberalism–nationalism Standoff Be Negotiated? Core Questions for Our Age Towards Ambiguous Tolerance in the US–China Relationship Can We Create a Global Dialogue? Civilisational Dialogue: Some Questions of Method Time for a Rethink of Human Nature? The World According to Rutger Bregman Notes 6 Relearning Multilateralism: The Principled Case for a Global Reset Community and Moral Solidarity Matter Shocks On Cooperation: Brake Or Accelerator? Multilateral Institutions (Still) Matter Networks and Hybridity Matter Notes 7 From Principle to Practice in a Multilateral Reset Towards Hard-Headed Internationalism Multilateralism and the Search for Leadership Multilateralism and the Search for Collective Institutional Governance Notes 8 Ten Propositions and a Provocation On World Order Proposition One: Liberalism Is in Crisis Proposition Two: Sovereignty as an Organising Principle Is Under Challenge But Will Not Go Away Proposition Three: US Leadership Is in Decline, in Both Hard Power and Soft Diplomatic Terms Proposition Four: Managing Cultural Difference in an Era of Digitalisation Is Now as Important as Managing Economics and Security in International Relations Proposition Five: Restraining Self-Interest Is Key to Taming and Reforming Globalisation Proposition Six: New Approaches to International Governance Offer Some Cause for Hope Proposition Seven: the US and China Are the Main Powers, But It Is Too Early to Write Off Europe Proposition Eight: Chinese ‘Revisionism’ Needs to Be Engaged Proposition Nine: Cooperative Dialogue Is Vital to Combatting Revived Zero-Sum Narratives Proposition Ten: the Prospect of a New Cold War and the Limits to Dialogue Are Real A Provocation: Can/will Asia Overtake the West? Notes Conclusion Note Bibliography INDEX