France, Germany, and Nuclear Deterrence: Quarrels and Convergences during the Cold War and Beyond

Description

The legacy of World War II and the division of Eastern and Western Europe produced a radical asymmetry, and a variety of misgivings and misunderstandings, in French and German experiences of the nuclear age. At the same time, however, political actors in both nations continually labored to reconcile their differences and engage in productive strategic dialogue. Grounded in cutting-edge research and freshly discovered archival sources, France, Germany, and Nuclear Deterrence teases out the paradoxical nuclear interactions between France and Germany from 1954 to the present day. France, Germany and Nuclear Deterrence Contents Abbreviations Introduction Part I. From the Beginning of the Franco-German Strategic Dialogue to the Nuclear Ambiguities of the ‘Adenauer/de Gaulle’ Era Chapter 1. Raymond Aron, Germany and the Atomic Bomb Chapter 2. France and the Abandoned Dream of a European Bomb, 1954–58 Chapter 3. From Bonn to Valhalla? Chapter 4. De Gaulle’s Nuclear Policy, West Germany and the Second Berlin Crisis Part II. Ostpolitik and the Franco-German Nuclear Relations in the 1970s Chapter 5. ‘Military Cooperation Is Not in Itself an Instrument of Progress’ Chapter 6. Implicit Convergence? Chapter 7. French Deterrence, the Defence of Europe and the German Question in the 1970s and 1980s Part III. The ‘Mitterrand/Kohl’ Era and the End of the Cold War Chapter 8. Evolution of the French Nuclear Strategy towards Germany during Mitterrand’s Presidency Chapter 9. France and the FRG during the 1980s Chapter 10. ‘Not a Nuclear Switzerland’ Part IV. Nuclear Uncertainties in the Post-Cold War Era Chapter 11. France, Germany and Nuclear Deterrence since the End of the Cold War Chapter 12. Walking Together in Different Directions Appendix Index