ENGLISH

Strategic Social Choice: Stable Representations of Constitutions

By Bezalel Peleg , Hans Peters (auth.)

Book information

Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Year
2010
ISBN
978-3-642-13874-4, 978-3-642-13875-1
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1
Language
english
Format
PDF
Filesize
1 MB (1565720 bytes)
Series
Studies in Choice and Welfare
Edition
1
Pages
154\162
Orientation
yes
Scanned
yes
Time added
2013-08-01 04:00:00
EconomicsGame Theory/Mathematical Methods; Game TheorySocial and Behav. Sciences; Economic Theory; Metho

Description

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.

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