Freud's Argument for the Oedipus Complex: A Philosophy of Science Analysis of the Case of Little Hans

Description

In this close reading of Freudian theory, Jerome C. Wakefield reconstructs Freud’s argument for the Oedipal theory of the psychoneuroses, placing the case of Little Hans into a philosophy-of-science context and critically rethinking the epistemological foundations of psychoanalysis. Wakefield logically evaluates four central Freudian arguments: the "undirected anxiety" argument which contends that Hans suffered from anxiety before he developed his horse phobia; the "day the horse fell down" argument where, engaging in some scholarly detective work, Wakefield resolves a century-old dispute between behaviorists and psychoanalysts about when Hans witnessed a frightening horse accident; the "N=1 sexual repression" argument that the trajectory of Hans’s sexual desires matches the Oedipal theory’s predictions; and lastly, the "detailed symptom characteristics" argument that the Oedipal theory is needed to understand otherwise inexplicable details of Hans’s symptoms. Wakefield demonstrates that, although Freud’s arguments are brilliantly conceived, he misread the facts of the Hans case and failed to support the Oedipal theory as judged by his own stated evidential standards. However, this failure creates an opportunity for renewed consideration of psychoanalysis’s distinctive contribution: the understanding of an individual’s unique meaning system and confrontation with meanings outside of focal awareness in order to reshape an individual’s fate. This book will be of interest to psychoanalysts and psychotherapists alike, and will prove essential for scholars working in the fields of psychoanalysis, philosophy of science, and the history of psychiatry. Cover Endorsement Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents Acknowledgments 1. Introduction: Freud’s Lakatosian Moment, or, Why Freud’s Case of Little Hans is the Most Important Clinical Theory Paper Freud Ever Wrote 2. “All My Efforts Valueless”: Freud’s Lifelong Concern with the Suggestion Objection as the Major Threat to Psychoanalytic Theory 3. “A More Direct and Less Roundabout Proof”: The Hans Case as Freud’s Response to the Suggestion Objection 4. “A Little Oedipus”: Freud’s Analysis of the Hans Case 5. Freud Versus the Fright Theory: Wolpe and Rachman’s Behaviorist Challenge to Freud’s Oedipal Analysis of the Little Hans Case 6. “Without an Object to Begin With”: Does the Case Evidence Support Freud’s Claim that Hans’s Disorder Started with a Period of Free-Floating Anxiety Preceding the Phobia? 7. “Chronological Considerations Make It Impossible”: The Day the Horse Fell Down: Resolving a Century-Old Puzzle 8. “A Repressive Process of Ominous Intensity”: Freud’s N=1 Sexual Repression Argument 9. Methodological Interlude: The Suitability Argument as Freud’s Foundational Methodology and His Reply to the Suggestion Objection 10. “Acquaintance at Close Quarters”: Evaluating Freud’s Suitability Argument for the Oedipal Theory of Hans’s Phobia 11. Critical Examination of Grunbaum’s “Tally Argument” Analysis of Freud’s Response to the Suggestion Objection 12. Conclusion: The Little Hans Case, Philosophy of Science, and the Fate of Psychoanalysis Index