Relational Passage of Time

Description

This book defends a relational theory of the passage of time. The realist view of passage developed in this book differs from the robust, substantivalist position. According to relationism, passage is nothing over and above the succession of events, one thing coming after another. Causally related events are temporally arranged as they happen one after another along observers’ worldlines. There is no unique global passage but a multiplicity of local passages of time. After setting out this positive argument for relationism, the author deals with five common objections to it: (a) triviality of deflationary passage, (b) a-directionality of passage, (c) the impossibility of experiencing passage, (d) fictionalism about passage, and (e) the incompatibility of passage with perduring objects. Relational Passage of Time will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of time, metaphysics, and philosophy of physics. Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents List of figures List of tables List of abbreviations Preface Acknowledgments Introduction Methodological approach Other relevant books The chapters in outline Notes Part I: The positive argument Chapter 1: Relational, not substantial, passage Classical antirealist and idealist arguments Substantivalism about passage Relational passage Relativity and fixed future Becoming without transience Notes Part II: Answering objections Chapter 2: Relational passage is neither trivial nor question-begging Notes Chapter 3: Passage is directed Notes Chapter 4: We experience and misconceive passage Notes Chapter 5: Passage is not a fiction Notes Chapter 6: Time passes amid perduring objects Notes Final thoughts Notes Bibliography Index