ENGLISH

The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information

By Dr. Helmut Meister (auth.)

Book information

Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Year
1987
ISBN
978-3-540-18429-4, 978-3-642-50278-1
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-50278-1
Language
english
Format
PDF
Filesize
3 MB (2836088 bytes)
Series
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 295
Edition
1
Pages
127\137
Time added
2013-12-12 02:00:00
Economic Theory

Description

The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.

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