The Bloomsbury Companion to Epistemology

Description

For anyone looking to better understand the topics at the centre of contemporary epistemology, The Bloomsbury Companion to Epistemology presents a valuable guide. This up-to-date Companion covers all the fundamental questions asked by epidemiologists today - areas that have continued to attract interest historically as well as topics that have emerged more recently as active areas of research. Fifteen specially-commissioned essays from a respected team of experts reveal where important work continues to be done in the area and the new directions the field is taking, such as: • Foundationalism by Daniel Howard-Snyder • Coherentism by Jonathan Kvanvig • Proper Functionalism by Kenneth Boyce and Alvin Plantinga • Evidentialism by Richard Feldman and Andrew Cullison • Experimental Epistemology by James R. Beebe Clearly written and featuring a detailed list of resources, glossary and a fully annotated bibliography, The Bloomsbury Companion to Epistemology introduces some of the most exciting topics in contemporary analytic philosophy. Title Page Copyright Page Contents Contributors Introduction Epistemology: A Brief Historical Overview and Some Puzzles about Methodology Epistemology: A brief historical overview Epistemology: Methodology Conclusion Problems for the standard method Skepticism about intuitions Feminist epistemology Epistemic relativism Outline of the chapters Notes References Chapter 1 The Nature of Knowledge Background Renewal Ultratraditionalism for a new reason Contextual infallibility Naturalistic antitraditionalism Nonnaturalistic antitraditionalism Virtue Conclusion Notes Chapter 2 Foundationalism Preliminary remarks Characterizing basic beliefs more precisely The capaciousness of foundationalism On the very idea of a basic belief On experiential foundationalism On behalf of foundationalism The Sellarsian Dilemma Notes References Chapter 3 Coherentism Coherentism and regress From schematic to substantive coherentism Arguments against coherentism Conclusion Notes Chapter 4 Infinitism Introduction The epistemic regress argument Outline of the four “solutions” to the regress problem The initial plausibility of the foundationalist solution The problems with the foundationalist and coherentist solutions Infinitism: A sketch and defense against objections Notes Chapter 5 Evidentialism What is evidentialism? In favor of evidentialism Problems with competing theories Objections to evidentialism Conclusion Notes References Chapter 6 Reliabilism Introduction Process Reliabilism as a theory of doxastic justification Process Reliabilism as a theory of knowledge Objections to Process Reliabilism An extension: Testimony Notes References Chapter 7 Proper Functionalism Introduction Motivations for proper functionalism Formulating a proper functionalist analysis of warrant Objections to proper functionalism Further directions Notes References Chapter 8 Skepticism and Justification Introduction Local skepticism directed at justified belief Responses to the arguments for localjustification skepticism Externalist responses to justification skepticism Skepticism concerning knowledge: A postscript Notes References Chapter 9 Epistemic Relativism Notes Chapter 10 A Priori Knowledge: The Conceptual Approach Introduction The state of play The problem A solution Concluding remarks Notes References Chapter 11 Contextualism and Interest-Relative Invariantism Three arguments for the Contextualism/IRI Disjunction Contextualism Interest-Relative Invariantism Conclusion: Tentative Verdicts about Two Important Issues Notes References Chapter 12 Formal Epistemology Dedicated in memory of Horacio Arló-Costa Why be formal? Coherence and dilation The FIE-Model of inquiry14 Notes References Chapter 13 Experimental Epistemology Gettier and Truetemp Error possibilities and stakes Knowledge and action Larger methodological issues Conclusion Notes References Chapter 14 Epistemic Value Introduction Motivations Main branches of work New directions The credit amplification principle Notes References Chapter 15 The Deep Rationality Theory of Wisdom Introduction Wisdom as epistemic humility Wisdom as knowledge Wisdom as living well Hybrid theory Wisdom as Deep Rationality Deep Rationality Theory Notes Glossary Research Resources Journals Phil Papers Blogs and Websites Internet encyclopedia of philosophy (select epistemology articles) Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy articles (select epistemology articles) Centers, societies, and annual conferences Bibliography Index