Secure Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Systems

Description

This book proposes secure schemes to address security challenges in secure automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast systems (ADS-B) from five different angles. First, the authors examine encryption schemes applied to the ADS-B environment for protecting messages confidentiality. Second, they propose an ADS-B broadcast authentication scheme with batch verification by employing an identity-based signature. Third, they present ADS-B broadcast authentication scheme based on a digital signature with message recovery, which provides a feature that the message is recoverable from the signature. Fourth, they propose a new cryptographic solution to ADS-B security. Finally, they propose an accurate and efficient cognitive aircraft location verification scheme preserving aircraft location privacy by utilizing a grid-based k-nearest neighbor algorithm. In summary, the authors show how ADS-B data links can greatly enhance flight safety by these proposed schemes without sacrificing data security. Preface Contents Acronyms List of Figures List of Tables 1 Introduction 1.1 Overview of ADS-B 1.1.1 Air Traffic Control 1.1.2 ADS-B Characteristics 1.1.3 ADS-B System Framework 1.1.4 ADS-B Message Format 1.1.5 ADS-B Protocol Stack 1.2 ADS-B Vulnerabilities 1.2.1 Passive Attacks 1.2.2 Active Attacks 1.2.3 GNSS Vulnerabilities 1.2.4 Security Risk Assessment 1.3 ADS-B Security Requirements 1.4 Aim and Organization of Monograph References 2 Modern Cryptography for ADS-B Systems 2.1 Overview of Modern Cryptography 2.1.1 Symmetric Ciphers 2.1.2 Advanced Encryption Standard 2.1.2.1 Working Mode 2.1.2.2 AES Encryption 2.1.2.3 AES Decryption 2.1.3 Message Authentication Code 2.1.4 Digital Signature 2.1.5 Public-Key Infrastructure 2.1.6 Identity-Based Cryptography 2.1.6.1 IBC History 2.1.6.2 IBC Operation Overview 2.1.6.3 Revocation in IBC 2.2 Existing Cryptographic Techniques for ADS-B 2.2.1 Privacy Protection 2.2.2 Integrity Assurance 2.2.3 Limitations of Existing Cryptographic Methods 2.2.3.1 Limitations of Symmetric Keys 2.2.3.2 Limitations of Asymmetric Keys 2.3 Emerging Cryptographic Techniques for ADS-B 2.3.1 Format-Preserving Encryption 2.3.1.1 An Illustration of Encrypting ADS-B Messages Using FFX 2.3.2 Vector Homomorphic Encryption 2.3.2.1 Original Scheme 2.3.2.2 Improved Scheme 2.3.2.3 Scheme Description 2.3.2.4 Security 2.3.2.5 Performance Comparison 2.3.3 TESLA Authentication 2.3.4 Location-Privacy Measurement 2.3.4.1 Proposed Approach 2.3.4.2 Experimental Results 2.4 Conclusion References 3 ADS-B Broadcast Authentication 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Related Work 3.3 Problem Statement 3.3.1 System Model and Threat Model 3.3.2 Design Objectives 3.3.3 Preliminaries 3.4 Batch Authentication 3.4.1 Utilization of Reserved Field 3.4.2 Details of AuthBatch 3.4.2.1 System Initialization 3.4.2.2 Broadcaster Registration 3.4.2.3 Signature Generation 3.4.2.4 Signature Verification 3.4.2.5 Key Evolution 3.4.3 Correctness and Security Analysis 3.4.3.1 Correctness 3.4.3.2 Authenticity and Integrity 3.4.3.3 Resilience of Key 3.4.4 Performance Evaluation 3.4.4.1 Computational Time 3.4.4.2 Communication Cost 3.5 Authentication with Message Recovery 3.5.1 Main Idea 3.5.2 Details of AuthMR 3.5.2.1 System Initialization 3.5.2.2 Broadcaster Registration 3.5.2.3 Message Signing and Broadcast 3.5.2.4 Verification and Recovery 3.5.2.5 Key Evolution 3.5.3 Correctness and Security Analysis 3.5.3.1 Correctness 3.5.3.2 Unforgeability 3.5.3.3 Independence 3.5.4 Performance Evaluation 3.5.4.1 Performance Evaluation in General 3.5.4.2 Communication Cost Comparison 3.5.4.3 Computational Time Estimation 3.6 Conclusion References 4 Aircraft Location Verification 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Related Work 4.3 Preliminaries 4.3.1 OpenSky Sensor Network 4.3.2 Time Difference of Arrival 4.4 Problem Statement 4.4.1 System Model 4.4.2 Threat Model 4.4.3 Design Objectives 4.5 Proposed Scheme 4.5.1 Grid Design with Altitude Change 4.5.2 Similarity Measurement over Ciphertexts 4.5.3 Privacy-Preserving Aircraft Location Verification 4.5.3.1 Initialization 4.5.3.2 Offline Training 4.5.3.3 Online Verification 4.6 Extended Discussion 4.7 Security Analysis 4.7.1 Confidentiality 4.7.2 Privacy 4.8 Experiment Evaluation 4.8.1 Experiment Environment 4.8.2 Accuracy 4.8.2.1 Accuracy in Estimating Legal Aircraft 4.8.2.2 Accuracy in Detecting Illegal Aircraft 4.8.3 Efficiency 4.8.4 Communication Cost 4.9 Conclusion References 5 Complete ADS-B Security Solution 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Related Work 5.3 Problem Statement 5.3.1 System Model 5.3.2 Threat Model 5.3.3 Design Objectives 5.4 Proposed Solution 5.4.1 Resistance to Passive Attacks 5.4.2 Resistance to Active Attacks 5.4.3 Framework 5.4.3.1 Initialization 5.4.3.2 Authentication 5.4.3.3 Toleration of Packet Loss 5.5 Extended Discussion 5.5.1 Disorder 5.5.2 Adaptive-TESLA 5.6 Security Analysis 5.6.1 Privacy 5.6.2 Authenticity and Integrity 5.6.3 Security Comparison 5.7 Performance Evaluation 5.7.1 Encryption 5.7.2 Authentication on ATCO 5.7.3 Authentication on Aircraft 5.8 Compatibility Analysis 5.9 Conclusion References 6 Conclusion and Future Work 6.1 Conclusion 6.2 Future Work 6.2.1 Secure Trajectory Validation and Prediction 6.2.1.1 Trajectory Validation 6.2.1.2 Trajectory Prediction 6.2.2 Authentication on Physical Layer 6.2.3 Event Detection 6.2.4 Message Anomaly Detection 6.2.4.1 Distance-Based Method 6.2.4.2 Reconstruction-Based Method References Index