Legality Matters: Crimes Against Humanity and the Problems and Promise of the Prohibition on Other Inhumane Acts

Description

Acknowledgements Contents Abbreviations 1 Introduction 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Expanding on the Elements 1.2.1 CAH: Not for the ICC Alone 1.2.2 The Broader Questions: Rethinking Retroactive Criminal Law and the Role of Courts 1.3 Looking Ahead: The Structure of My Argument 1.4 Conclusion References 2 Theoretical Underpinnings: Understanding the Prohibition on Retroactive Criminal Law 2.1 Introduction and Overview 2.2 Preliminary Matters 2.2.1 Fuller: A Theory for All Systems 2.2.2 Legitimacy and Legality 2.3 Fuller’s Account: The Process of Law and the Legitimacy of the Law 2.3.1 Legitimate Law-Making is Reciprocal 2.3.2 Legal Subject as Law-Making Agent 2.3.3 A Duty to Obey Arises from Reciprocity 2.3.4 Reciprocity and Legitimacy; Focus on Process, Not Results 2.3.5 The Elements that Reciprocity Demands 2.3.6 When Process Fails 2.3.7 Implications: A Closer Look at the Details of Law-Making 2.3.8 The Place of Retroactive Laws in a Legitimate Legal System 2.3.9 Clarifying Fuller’s Theory: Retroactive Criminal Laws May Be Permissible 2.3.10 What Remains? 2.4 Summary 2.5 Implications for the Process of Law-Making 2.6 Application to International Criminal Law References 3 The Prohibition on Retroactive Criminal Law in International Criminal Law 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Preliminary Matters 3.2.1 My Sources Explained 3.2.2 The Prohibition on Retroactive Criminal Law: A Variable Concept 3.3 Prologue: The Principle Prior to Nuremberg 3.3.1 Overview 3.3.2 The Prohibition Was Not a Treaty Norm 3.3.3 The Prohibition Was Not a Norm of Customary International Law 3.3.4 The Prohibition Was Not a General Principle of Law 3.3.5 A Brief Overview of Divergent Conceptions and Practice 3.3.6 Summary 3.4 The Opening Movement: The Acceptance of the Prohibition in International Criminal Law 3.4.1 Role of the International Military Tribunal 3.5 The International Courts Were Sources of Law 3.6 Subsequent Clarifications 3.6.1 The Nuremberg Military Tribunals Have a Say 3.6.2 Summary 3.7 IHRL Developments: The Contribution of Human Rights Law to the Prohibition on Retroactive Criminal Law 3.8 Recent ICL Developments: Clarifying the Prohibition in Customary and Conventional International Criminal Law 3.8.1 Overview 3.8.2 Customary Law Developments: The Contributions of the Ad Hoc Tribunals 3.8.3 The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Agreement with the ICTY 3.8.4 Summarizing the Tribunals’ Position 3.8.5 The International Criminal Court: Rome Provides a Different View 3.8.6 The Conventional Approach and Customary Law 3.9 The Customary Prohibition Unpacked 3.9.1 The Outlines of the Prohibition: The Content Clarified 3.10 The Departures: The Permissible Categories of Retroactive Criminal Law 3.10.1 Clarifications of General Prohibitions 3.10.2 The ECtHR in Support: The Case of CR v. UK 3.10.3 The CR Case in Domestic Courts: Background 3.10.4 The CR Case in Domestic Courts: The Trial 3.10.5 The CR Case in Domestic Courts: The First Appeal 3.10.6 The CR Case in Domestic Courts: A Second Appeal 3.10.7 The CR Case: An Analysis of the Decisions 3.11 The Implications of the CR Decisions 3.11.1 Looking at CR Through a Fullerian Lens 3.11.2 The Clarification Exception: Further Support 3.11.3 Elaborations of the Law: Another Acceptable Exception to the Prohibition 3.11.4 Acceptable (Accepted) Elaborations in Early ICL Developments 3.11.5 Recently Accepted Elaborations: Confirmation of the Acceptability of the Practice 3.11.6 An Explanation of Why Elaborations Are Acceptable 3.12 Critiquing the Tribunals Approach: Lessons from Fuller References 4 Crimes Against Humanity: Introduction, Development and Acceptance 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Evolution of Crimes Against Humanity 4.2.1 Overview 4.2.2 The IHL origins of Crimes Against Humanity: Pre-World War II Developments 4.2.3 World War II and Post-War Developments 4.2.4 International and National Advance and Harmonization 4.3 Explaining the Adherence 4.3.1 Crimes Against Humanity: Retroactive Criminal Laws 4.3.2 The Acceptance, and Acceptability of Crimes Against Humanity: A Look Through a Fullerian Lens 4.3.3 The Problem of Opposite Notice 4.3.4 Summary 4.4 A Final Point References 5 Other Inhumane Acts: Development and Critique 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Terminology 5.3 Contrasting the Articulations 5.4 Interpreting the Instruments: From Characterization to Consistency 5.4.1 Introduction 5.4.2 The Early Characterizations 5.4.3 Evolving Analyses 5.5 Comparing and Critiquing the Interpretation 5.5.1 Methodological Flaws 5.5.2 Identifying Some Deeper Problems 5.5.3 Possible Alternatives to the Current Approach 5.6 Re-thinking the Residual Clause: The Problem of Its Nature 5.6.1 Introduction 5.6.2 The Gravity Requirement: An Opening to Uncertain Applications of the Law 5.6.3 Arguing for a New Understanding 5.6.4 Re-reading the Clause: An Invitation, not a Prohibition 5.6.5 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Why More Is Needed 5.7 A Look Through a Fullerian Lens References 6 A New Way Forward: Advocating a Fullerian Approach to Other Inhumane Acts 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Outline 6.3 Courts as Law-Makers 6.4 Articulating a New Framework 6.4.1 Identifying the Elements 6.4.2 Defining Inhumanity 6.5 Inhumanity: A Criminal Law Look 6.5.1 Introduction 6.5.2 Inhumanity: The Proper Focus 6.5.3 Victim Focus: Should Elements Be Divisible? 6.5.4 A Case Study: Deportation as Dehumanization 6.6 Developing Identifiers 6.6.1 Introduction 6.6.2 Bodily Harm as an Indicator 6.6.3 Mental Harm: An Alternative Indication 6.6.4 Denial of Choice; A Possible Indicator 6.7 Summary 6.8 Justifying the New Approach 6.9 Identifying the Elements 6.9.1 Introduction 6.9.2 Identifying the Elements: Essential on Any Approach 6.10 The Evidence and Process 6.11 Conclusion 6.12 Some Final Thoughts References Index