Mechanisms and Consciousness: Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science

Description

This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes a mechanistic model that offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness. While mechanistic models of explanation are widely applied in cognitive science, their approach to describing subjective phenomena is limited. The author argues that phenomenology can fill this gap. He proposes two novel ways of integrating phenomenology and mechanism. First, he presents a novel reading of phenomenological analyses as functional analyses. Such functional phenomenology delivers a functional sketch of a target system and provides constraints on the space of possible mechanisms. Second, he develops a neurophenomenological approach to dynamic modeling of experience. He shows that it can deliver a dynamic model of a target phenomenon, in this case a model of subjective experience, and inform the search for an underlying mechanism. Mechanisms and Consciousness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and the cognitive sciences. Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Table of Contents List of Figures Acknowledgments Epigraphs Introduction Outline of This Book References Part I: Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science Chapter 1: The Concept of Phenomenology 1.1 Introduction 1.2 What Is Phenomenology 1.2.1 Reduction and Variation as Phenomenological Methods 1.2.2 Intentionality 1.2.3 Static and Genetic Approaches 1.2.4 Phenomenological Psychology 1.3 What Phenomenology Is Not 1.3.1 Phenomenology Is Not Introspection 1.3.2 Phenomenology Is Not About Qualia 1.3.3 Phenomenology Is Not Anti-Naturalistic 1.4 Why We Need Phenomenology in Explaining Consciousness 1.5 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 2: Naturalizing Phenomenology Reconsidered 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Three Views on the Naturalization of Phenomenology 2.3 Mathematization 2.4 A Question of Constraints 2.4.1 Conceptual Constraints 2.4.1.1 Front-Loaded Phenomenology 2.4.1.2 Formalization of Phenomenological Description 2.4.1.3 Applied Ontology and Semantic Bridging 2.4.2 Isomorphism 2.4.3 Neurophenomenology and Generative Passages 2.4.4 Neurophenomenology and Homeomorphism 2.5 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 3: Models of Explanation in Cognitive Science 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Scientific Explanation—Background 3.3 Models of Explanation in Cognitive Science 3.3.1 Deductive-Nomological Model of Explanation 3.3.2 Personal Explanations 3.3.2.1 Heterophenomenology Explained 3.3.3 Functional Explanations 3.3.4 Dynamical Explanations 3.3.5 Mechanistic Explanations 3.3.5.1 Mechanisms 3.3.5.2 Models of Mechanisms 3.3.5.3 Levels of Mechanisms 3.3.5.4 Limits of Mechanistic Explanation 3.4 Explanatory Integration of Cognitive Science 3.4.1 Theoretical Reduction, Unification, and Integration 3.4.2 Mechanistic Integration of Cognitive Science 3.4.3 Autonomy 3.5 Is Phenomenology Explanatory? 3.5.1 Types of Phenomenological Explanation 3.5.2 Phenomenological Understanding 3.6 Conclusion: Toward Integration of Phenomenology With Multilevel Mechanistic Explanation Notes References Part II: Phenomenology and Mechanism: In Search of Constraints Chapter 4: Phenomenology and Functionalism 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Husserlian Phenomenology and Computational Functionalism 4.3 The Notion of Function and the Idea of Functional Phenomenology in Husserl 4.4 Functional Analysis and Phenomenological Decomposition 4.4.1 Phenomenological Decomposition 4.5 Toward Functional-Mechanistic Naturalization 4.5.1 Example 1: First-Person Perspective 4.5.2 Example 2: Vision Studies 4.6 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 5: Phenomenology and Dynamical Modeling 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Integrating the Dynamical and Mechanistic Frameworks 5.3 Neurophenomenology and Dynamical Systems Theory 5.4 Discovering the Dynamics of Experience—Epilepsy Study 5.5 Micro-Phenomenology—Toward Diachronic Models of Experience 5.6 Conclusion: Toward Phenomenologically Informed Dynamical Constraints Notes References Chapter 6: Conclusion: Toward Methodologically Guided Mutual Constraints 6.1 Constraining Phenomenology References Index