Licensing Standard Essential Patents: FRAND and the Internet of Things

Description

What is the licensing framework of standard essential patents (SEPs) for connectivity standards such as 5G and Wi-Fi? How will the framework change with the Internet of Things (IoT)? This book provides comprehensive answers to these questions. For over two decades, connectivity standards have been the subject of litigation and controversy around the globe. Now, with the introduction of 5G and the emergence of the world of connected objects, or the IoT, the licensing framework for SEPs is becoming even more contentious. In order to bring clarity to the debate, this book analyses and explains key components of a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licence for SEPs; clarifies the economic, policy and market background of SEP disputes; examines the interrelated application of contract, patent and competition laws; and describes the approaches by courts and regulators in the EU, US and the UK. Importantly, the book also assesses how the experience from the smartphone and ICT industries can be applied in a new environment of the IoT, and considers what needs to be changed in the future SEP licensing landscape. The book provides a holistic coverage of SEP licensing issues in an attempt to reduce uncertainty within this highly complex and technical area, and will be useful to practitioners, policy makers, SMEs and large technology companies in the IoT, as well as academics interested in the field. Foreword Acknowledgements Contents Abbreviations List of Cases and Legislation Introduction I. Setting the Context II. Structure PART I:
THE STANDARD-DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 1. Standards, Standard-Development Organisations and Standard Essential Patents I. Standards II. Standard Development Organisations III. Standard Essential Patents IV. Conclusion 2. The Dynamics of Standard Essential Patent Licensing: Patent Holdup, Holdout and Royalty Stacking I. Industry Convergences and Changing Market Dynamics II. Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking III. Criticism of Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theories IV. Patent Holdout V. Conclusion PART II:
THE MEANING AND CONTENT OF A FRAND LICENCE 3. The Nature of a FRAND Commitment I. The Principles and the Text of a FRAND Commitment II. The Enforceability of a FRAND Commitment III. Conclusion 4. FRAND Royalty I. The Principles of FRAND Royalty II. Calculating FRAND Royalties in Practice III. Conclusion 5. The Non-Discrimination Requirement of a FRAND Commitment I. Positive and Negative Aspects of Price Discrimination in Standard Essential Patent Licensing II. The Non-Discrimination Requirement in the Text of a FRAND Commitment III. No Requirement to Apply Uniform Terms to All Licensees IV. Interpretations of the Non-Discrimination Requirement of a FRAND Commitment V. The Application of the Non-Discrimination Requirement of a FRAND Commitment VI. Confidentiality Agreements and Disclosure of Licences VII. Conclusion 6. FRAND Royalty Base I. Introduction: The End-Product or Component? II. The Appropriate FRAND Royalty Base III. The Legal Requirement to Use a Particular Royalty Base IV. The Royalty Base in Standard Essential Patent Litigation V. Conclusion 7. FRAND and Value Chain Licensing I. The Value Chain Licensing Debate II. Patent Law and Value Chain Licensing III. FRAND Commitments and Value Chain Licensing IV. Competition Law and Value Chain Licensing V. Policy Outlook for the Internet of Things VI. Conclusion 8. Remedies I. Injunctions II. Global or Territorial Scope of a FRAND Licence? III. Antisuit Injunctions IV. Past Damages V. Procedural Remedies to Facilitate Patent Licensing VI. Conclusion PART III:
STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENT LICENSING
IN THE INTERNET OF THINGS 9. Standard Essential Patent Licensing in the Internet of Things I. Challenges of FRAND Licensing in the Internet of Things II. Current Proposals for Improving the Standard Essential Patent Licensing Framework III. Collective Licensing Models for the Internet of Things IV. Conclusion Bibliography Index