Perspectives on Kuhn: Contemporary Approaches to the Philosophy of Thomas Kuhn

Description

This book presents essays and commentaries that continue on Thomas Kuhn’s work from where he left off at the time of his death. Contrary to other books, this volume picks up the gauntlet to develop, from a contemporary perspective, some points that can be improved in the light of recent findings and conceptualizations in metatheory. Thus, this work pays a visit to the classical Kuhnian landscapes, but rather proposing interpretations, it takes them as the starting point to go further. One hundred years after Kuhn's birth, the editors and authors rekindle the passion and interest that have always surrounded the work of the great Boston philosopher and historian. Preface Contents Chapter 1: Kuhn, Coherentism and Perception 1.1 Introduction 1.2 The Coherentist Reading of Kuhn 1.3 A Shortcoming of the Coherentist Reading 1.4 The Input Objection to Coherentism 1.5 A Kuhnian Response to the Input Objection 1.6 Kuhn, the Cartesian Paradigm and the Myth of the Given 1.7 Conclusion References Chapter 2: Sankey on Kuhn and Epistemological Coherentism: A Commentary 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Kuhn and Lewis’s “the Given” 2.3 Kuhn and Wittgenstein’s on Certainty 2.3.1 Kuhn’s New Questions 2.3.2 Kinds of Belief 2.3.3 Modes of Change 2.3.4 Kuhn’s Attitude Towards Epistemology 2.4 Conclusion References Chapter 3: A Defense of Structure in Structure of Scientific Revolutions 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Is Structure a Contribution to the History of Science? 3.3 Structure and Structures in Philosophy of Science 3.4 What Structure Is Not References Chapter 4: A Vindication of Structure in Structure of Scientific Revolutions: A Comment to K. Brad Wray 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Wray vs. Daston 4.3 Kuhnian Historiography 4.4 Structures as Historical Regularities 4.5 Conclusion References Chapter 5: Kuhn’s Reconstruction of Structure: The Theoretical Background 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Ethnography and Reconstruction 5.3 What Constitutes a Lexicon? 5.4 A Recurring Outline 5.5 Reconstructing Our History 5.6 Lexicons, Relativism and Truth 5.7 Conclusion References Archival Sources Published Texts and Secondary Literature Chapter 6: A Role for Cognitive Agents from a Kuhnian Point of View: A Comment to Juan Vicente Mayoral 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The Relevance of Individuals in Kuhn 6.3 A Compatibility Account: Rational and Interpretative Individual 6.4 Learning a Lexicon: Variability and Their Limits 6.5 Reconsidering the Activity of an Interpretive Individual: The Context of Discovery References Chapter 7: Incommensurability and Metaincommensurability. Kind Change, World Change and Indirect Refutation 7.1 Introduction 7.2 What Causes Incommensurability? 7.3 What Are the Consequences of Incommensurability? 7.4 How Does Feyerabend’s Conception of Incommensurability Differ from Kuhn’s? 7.5 What Does Incommensurability Imply About Theory Comparison? 7.6 What Do Kuhn’s Views on Incommensurability Imply About Theory Comparison? 7.7 What Do Feyerabend’s Views About Incommensurability Imply About Theory Comparison? 7.8 What Do Howard Sankey’s Views on Incommensurability Imply About Theory Comparison? 7.9 What Does Incommensurability Imply About Theory Comparison? A Response to Sankey 7.10 What Does Incommensurability Imply About Scientific Realism? 7.11 What Does Incommensurability Imply About Scientific Progress? 7.12 What Is the Justification of Incommensurability? 7.13 What Is Metaincommensurability? 7.14 What Causes Metaincommensurability? 7.15 What Are the Consequences of Metaincommensurability? 7.16 What Is the Justification of Metaincommensurability? 7.17 What Can We Conclude About Incommensurability and Metaincommensurability? References Chapter 8: The Landscape of a Metaphysical Battlefield: A Comment on Eric Oberheim 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The Exegetic Dimension 8.3 The Phenomenological Dimension 8.4 The Metaphysical Dimension 8.5 Conclusion References Chapter 9: The Plausibility of Thomas Kuhn’s Metaphysics 9.1 Introduction 9.2 The Problem: Scientists and the World 9.3 World Change and Shifts of Vision 9.4 A Philosophical Interlude 9.5 Shifts of Vision, Again 9.6 The Historian’s Viewpoint 9.7 “Change of World View” or “Change of World”? 9.8 Conclusion References Chapter 10: Seeing, Talking and Behaving… Ways of Inhabiting the World: A Comment to Paul Hoyningen-Huene 10.1 Introduction 10.2 First Concern: What If the World Doesn’t Change? 10.3 Once Upon a Time, a World 10.4 Navigating Two Worlds 10.5 Don’t Forget to Look Back 10.6 Second Concern: Same Moon, Different moon 10.7 Layers in the Meaning, Layers in the World 10.8 Give Me the Lexicon and I’ll Give You the Laws 10.9 Ways of Lexicon Making 10.10 Conclusion References Index