Philosophical Relativity

Description

In this short but meaty book, Peter Unger questions the objective answers that have been given to central problems in philosophy. As Unger hypothesizes, many of these problems are unanswerable, including the problems of knowledge and scepticism, the problems of free will, and problems of causation and explanation. In each case, he argues, we arrive at one answer only relative to an assumption about the meaning of key terms, terms like "know" and like "cause," even while we arrive at an opposite answer relative to quite different assumptions, but equally arbitrary assumptions, about what the key terms mean. CONTENTS......Page p0007.djvu PREFACE......Page p0009.djvu 1. Problems without Solutions......Page p0013.djvu 2. Philosophical Relativity and Semantic Relativity......Page p0015.djvu 3. Contextualism and Invariantism......Page p0016.djvu 4. Alternative Psychologies......Page p0021.djvu 5. Events in Real Time and in Real Brains: Alternative Interpretations......Page p0023.djvu 6. Two Levels for Relativity: Words and Objects......Page p0024.djvu 7. Indeterminacy of Translation and Holistic Explanation......Page p0025.djvu 1. Contrasting Groups of Expressions......Page p0031.djvu 2. Statements, Beliefs, and Truth-values......Page p0035.djvu 3. Logic and Meaning......Page p0037.djvu 4. Sortalism......Page p0040.djvu 5. Extreme Semantic Approaches......Page p0043.djvu 6. The Relativity and the Rationality of Contextualism......Page p0045.djvu 7. The Appeal of Invariantism......Page p0047.djvu 8. General Sentences, Conversational Interests, and Contexts of Utterance......Page p0050.djvu 9. The Compatible Vagueness of Semantic and Pragmatic Terms......Page p0053.djvu 1. A Problem of Knowledge......Page p0056.djvu 2. A Problem of Power and of Freedom......Page p0064.djvu 3. A Problem of Causation......Page p0068.djvu 4. A Problem of Explanation......Page p0070.djvu 5. Categorical Problems and Conditional Problems......Page p0072.djvu IV. ON THE STATUS OF OSTENSIBLE INTUITIONS......Page p0075.djvu 1. The Objection from Semantic Intuitions......Page p0076.djvu 2. Semantic Intuitions Concerning Problematic Words......Page p0077.djvu 3. The Objection Reformulated......Page p0079.djvu 4. Two Invariantist Replies......Page p0080.djvu 5. A Direct Relativist Reply......Page p0084.djvu 6. How Commonsense Beliefs Account for Appearances of Intuitions: An Explanatory Sketch......Page p0085.djvu V. TWO APPROACHES TO OSTENSIBLE INTUITIONS......Page p0089.djvu 1. The Prevalent Approach to Responses and the Causal Theory of Reference......Page p0090.djvu 2. Some Problems for the Causal Theory and for the Prevalent Approach......Page p0093.djvu 3. Some Advantages of a Psychological Approach to Examples......Page p0100.djvu 4. Perceived Threats to Our System of Beliefs......Page p0105.djvu 5. Egocentric Attitudes as Determinants of Response......Page p0107.djvu 6. Ostensible Intuitions, Commonsense Beliefs, and Semantic Relativity......Page p0112.djvu VI. THE STATUS OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS......Page p0115.djvu 1. An Objection from Particular Expressions......Page p0116.djvu 2. An Objection from a Particular Language......Page p0120.djvu 3. An Objection from Overgeneralization......Page p0122.djvu 4. An Objection from Unnaturalness......Page p0123.djvu 5. Prospects for Philosophy......Page p0125.djvu NOTES......Page p0131.djvu K......Page p0141.djvu Z......Page p0142.djvu