Blockheads!: Essays on Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness (The MIT Press)

Description

New essays on the philosophy of Ned Block, with substantive and wide-ranging responses by Block. Perhaps more than any other philosopher of mind, Ned Block synthesizes philosophical and scientific approaches to the mind; he is unique in moving back and forth across this divide, doing so with creativity and intensity. Over the course of his career, Block has made groundbreaking contributions to our understanding of intelligence, representation, and consciousness. Blockheads! (the title refers to Block's imaginary counterexample to the Turing test—and to the Block-enthusiast contributors) offers eighteen new essays on Block's work along with substantive and wide-ranging replies by Block. The essays and responses not only address Block's past contributions but are rich with new ideas and argument. They importantly clarify many key elements of Block's work, including his pessimism concerning such thought experiments as Commander Data and the Nation of China; his more general pessimism about intuitions and introspection in the philosophy of mind; the empirical case for an antifunctionalist, biological theory of phenomenal consciousness; the fading qualia problem for a biological theory; the link between phenomenal consciousness and representation (especially spatial representation); and the reducibility of phenomenal representation. Many of the contributors to Blockheads! are prominent philosophers themselves, including Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, Frank Jackson, and Hilary Putnam. Contributors Ned Block, Bill Brewer, Richard Brown, Tyler Burge, Marisa Carrasco, David Chalmers, Frank Jackson, Hakwan Lau, Geoffrey Lee, Janet Levin, Joseph Levine, William G. Lycan, Brian P. McLaughlin, Adam Pautz, Hilary Putnam, Sydney Shoemaker, Susanna Siegel, Nicholas Silins, Daniel Stoljar, Michael Tye, Sebastian Watzl Contents Introduction: Themes in Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness 1. Four Imaginary Cases 2. Three Empirical Cases 3. The Mind behind the Cases 4. Themes in Block’s Work Notes References 1. Attention and Direct Realism 1. Attention and Direct Realism 2. Direct Realism and Its Alternatives 3. Attention and the Object View 4. Mental Paint 5. Phenomenological Character Notes References 2. The Direct Realist Approach to Illusion: Reply to Bill Brewer References 3. Psychological Content and Egocentric Indexes I. The Nature of Perceptual Representational Content II. Representational Content as a Psychological Kind III. The Nature of Egocentric Indexes IV. Egocentric Indexes and So-Called Relativized Propositions V. Uses of Individual, Spatial, and Temporal Egocentric Indexes Notes References 4. Tyler Burge on Perceptual Adaptation References 5. Attention Alters Appearance 1. Covert Attention 2. Does Attention Alter Appearance? 3. Psychophysical Paradigm to Evaluate Effects of Attention on Appearance 4. Attention Alters Appearance: Empirical Evidence 5. Presaccadic Attention Increases Perceived Contrast 6. Ruling Out Alternative Explanations 7. Conclusion References 6. Attention Affects Appearance: Response to Marisa Carrasco 7. Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience 1. First Puzzle: Left-Right Illusions 2. Second Puzzle: Size Illusions 3. Third Puzzle: Shape Illusions 4. Spatiotemporal Functionalism 5. Antiskeptical Conclusion Appendix: Is There a Categorical Phenomenology of Left and Right? Notes References 8. David Chalmers on Shape and Color Notes References 9. Physicalism and the A Priori 1. A Bit of History 2. Physicalism as the Denial of Tailor-Made Mental Properties 3. The Determination Physicalists (Nearly All) Agree On 4. Against the Metaphysical Reading of A Posteriori Physicalism 5. What, Exactly, Are the Zombie and Knowledge Arguments About? 6. As a Doctrine about Words and Sentences 7. A Doctrine about Concepts 8. The Qualia Illusion Notes References 10. Reply to Frank Jackson on A Priori Necessitation References 11. The Emperor’s New Phenomenology? The Empirical Case for Conscious Experiences without First-Order Representations Plausible Empirical Cases of Empty Higher-Order Representations with Phenomenally Conscious Experience The No-Conscious-Experience Interpretation The Full-Conscious-Experience Interpretation The Partial-Conscious-Experience Interpretation Resisting the Trilemma? Notes References 12. Empirical Science Meets Higher-Order Views of Consciousness: Reply to Hakwan Lau and Richard Brown Rare Charles Bonnet Syndrome Peripheral Vision Inattentional Inflation References 13. Alien Subjectivity and the Importance of Consciousness 1. Developing the Deflationary Pluralist View 2. Motivating Deflationary Pluralism: Reductionism and the Epistemology of Significance 3. Defending Descriptive Deflationary Pluralism 4. Implications and Questions for Further Discussion Notes References 14. Geoff Lee’s Hegemony of the Third Person References 15. Representational Exhaustion I. Can Strong Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument? II. Strong Representationalism and the Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience III. Is Weak Representationalism Incoherent? IV. Weak Representationalism and the Individuation of Color Experiences V. Conclusion Notes References 16. Strong Representationism and Unconscious Perception: Reply to Janet Levin Notes References 17. On Phenomenal Access 1. Introduction 2. Intentionalism, Representationalism, and Transparency 3. Reflexivity 4. Alternatives and Problems Notes References 18. Intuitions and the Metaphysics of Mind: Reply to Joe Levine Note References 19. Block and the Representation Theory of Sensory Qualities I. Broader Disagreement II. Distinctions III. A Bit More on the Representation Theory IV. Block Not on the Argument from Apparent Phenomenal Individuals V. Block’s Old (1990s) Objections VI. Mental Paint VII. Block’s Most Recent Objections VIII. Conclusion Notes References 20. Puzzled about Sensory Qualities: Reply to Bill Lycan References 21. Could an Android Be Sentient 1. Honing Our Question 2. Beware of Our Darwinian Buttons 3. Functional Isomorphs 4. Commander Data 5. Block’s No-Conception Hypothesis 6. Is It All Too Vague? 7. A Hypothetical Positive Conception 8. Data and Theories of Mind 9. Absent-RoleCases 10. Perception sans Phenomenal Consciousness 11. Language and Human-Level Intelligence sans Phenomenal Consciousness 12. Occurrent Thought sans Phenomenal Consciousness 13. Self-Consciousness sans Phenomenal Consciousness 14. Moral Personhood sans Phenomenal Consciousness 15. Brief Interlude: The Value of Phenomenal Consciousness 16. Neural Correlates of Phenomenal Consciousness 17. Alien Qualia Notes References 22. Functional Role, Superficialism, and Commander Data: Reply to Brian McLaughlin References 23. How Can Brains in Vats Experience a Spatial World? A Puzzle for Internalists 1. Why Take Internalism about Experience Seriously? 2. From Envatted Brains to Irreducible Intentionality: The BIV Argument Sketched 3. First Step: External Directedness 4. Second Step: Phenomenal Representation 5. Final Step: Irreducibility 6. Sketch of a Possible Solution: The Internal Grounding View of Phenomenal Representation Notes References 24. Arguments Pro and Con on Adam Pautz’s External Directedness Principle Note References 25. “Naïve Realism” and Qualia Is “Sameness” Well Defined in the Case of Qualia? Problems with My Argument against Qualia “Naïve” Realism Russell’s Position Again Some Ways of Rejecting Russell’s Picture Externalism as a Break with Russell’s Internalist Picture The Problem A Relevant Objection to Reliabilism Two Unsound Objections to Reliabilism (1): Cartesian Skepticism Unanswerable Two Unsound Objections to Reliabilism (2): Kantian Skepticism Unanswerable Some Observations on the “How Is It Possible?”Question The Epistemic Role of Qualia Notes References 26. Concepts and Percepts: Reply to Hilary Putnam Mind-Body Identity Conceptual Content of Percepts References 27. Phenomenal Character and Physicalism I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX Notes References 28. Sydney Shoemaker on Transparency and the Inverted Spectrum References 29. Attention and Perceptual Justification 1. Preliminaries 2. Two Theses 3. Motivating Attention Optional 4. First Challenge to Attention Optional: Propositional Justification Has to Be Usable 5. Is Propositional Justification from Experience Limited to Low-Grade Reportability? 6. What Are the Rational Roles of Attention? Notes References 30. Attention as a Conduit: Reply to Nicholas Silins and Susanna Siegel Note References 31. In Praise of Poise 1. Introduction 2. Two Definitions of Access Consciousness 3. The Modal Objection 4. Atkinson and Davies 5. Block’s Replacement 6. Attention 7. Access Consciousness as Poise Grounded in Attention 8. D4 and the Modal Objection 9. Is Attention Necessary? 10. Is Attention Sufficient? 11. Is Attention Phenomenal? 12. Different Notions of Poise? 13. Burge’s Discussion 14. Access and Phenomenal 15. The Emphatic Argument 16. Why the Argument Fails 17. Concluding Remarks Notes References 32. Poise, Dispositions, and Access Consciousness: Reply to Daniel Stoljar Note References 33. Homunculi Heads and Silicon Chips: The Importance of History to Phenomenology 1. Corporations 2. The Original China-Body System 3. Elementary-Particle People 4. Silicon Chips 5. History Matters Notes References 34. Fading Qualia: A Response to Michael Tye Note References 35. Can Representationism Explain How Attention Affects Appearances? 1. The Target of Block’s Argument 2. The Problem of Arbitrary Phenomenal Variation 3. The Space of Responses and Why Most of Them Fail 4. A Better Response: Deny No Error 5. Conclusion Notes References 36. Optimal Attention: Reply to Sebastian Watzl References Bibliography of Ned Block’s Works Contributors Index