Oil Crisis in Iran: From Nationalism to Coup d'Etat

Description

Focusing on the turbulent twenty-eight months between April 1951 and August 1953, this book, based on recently declassified CIA and US State Department documents from the Mossadeq administration tell the story of the Iranian oil crisis, which would culminate in the coup of August 1953. Throwing fresh light on US involvement in Iran, Ervand Abrahamian reveals exactly how immersed the US was in internal Iranian politics long before the 1953 coup, in parliamentary politics and even in saving the monarchy in 1952. By weighing rival explanations for the coup, from internal discontent, a fear of communism and oil nationalization, Abrahamian shows how the Truman and Eisenhower administrations did not differ significantly in their policies towards Mossadeq, and how the surprising main obstacle to an earlier coup was the shah himself. In tracing the key involvement of the US and CIA in Iran, this study shows how the 1953 coup would eventually pave the way to the 1979 Iranian revolution, two of the most significant and widely studied episodes of modern Iranian history. Cover Half-title page Title page Copyright page Dedication Contents Preface Chronology List of Notable Persons Introduction 1 US Involvement 2 US Concerns: Oil or Communism? 3 Parliamentary Politics 4 The Road to the Coup 5 Memory Revised Selected Bibliography Index