From Puzzles to Principles?: Essays on Aristotle's Dialectic

Description

Scholars of classical philosophy have long disputed whether Aristotle was a dialectical thinker. Most agree that Aristotle contrasts dialectical reasoning with demonstrative reasoning, where the former reasons from generally accepted opinions and the latter reasons from the true and primary. Starting with a grasp on truth, demonstration never relinquishes it. Starting with opinion, how could dialectical reasoning ever reach truth, much less the truth about first principles? Is dialectic then an exercise that reiterates the prejudices of one's times and at best allows one to persuade others by appealing to these prejudices, or is it the royal road to first principles and philosophical wisdom? In From Puzzles to Principles? May Sim gathers experts to argue both these positions and offer a variety of interpretive possibilities. The contributors' thoughtful reflections on the nature and limits of dialectic should play a crucial role in Aristotelian scholarship. From Puzzles to Principles? Contents Introduction Chapter One— For Dialectic Puts Questions about Matters which Philosophy Knows Conclusion Special Notes Notes Chapter Two— The Diodorean Modalities and the Master Argument I II III Notes Chapter Three— Dialectic and Method in Aristotle I— 'This in Itself Is Sufficient Proof' II— Dialectical Argument and the Art of Dialectic III— The Starting Points of Dialectic: 'Not Everyone's Opinions Count Equally' IV— Dialectic and the Route to the Principles V— Conclusions Notes Chapter Four— The Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic I— Conflicting Views of Dialectic II— What Is Dialectic? A First Approach III— Objections to the Sufficiency of Dialectic IV— How to Do Dialectic: Some Initial Questions V— Different Forms of Dialectic VI— Give and Take in Dialectical Inquiry VII— Reasoning from What Is Most Endoxon VIII— Rank Ordering among Endoxa IX— Dialectic and Peirastic in Scientific Inquiry X— Some Main Features of Peirastic XI— Dialectic in Science: A Standard View XII— Revision of the Standard View XIII— Dialectic in Science: The Traditional View XIV— Dialectical Justification in Science XV— The Merits of Peirastic Justification Notes Chapter Five— Choosing the Good in Aristotle's Topics I II III IV V Notes Chapter Six— The Normalization of Perplexity in Aristotle Notes Chapter Seven— Dialectic, Contradiction, and Paraconsistency in Aristotle I II III IV V Notes Chapter Eight— Perception and Dialectic in Aristotle's De Anima I II III Notes Chapter Nine— Aristotle's Discovery of First Principles Puzzles An Irwin Excursus An Aristotelian Solution Conclusions Notes Chapter Ten— Dialectical Communities: From the One to the Many and Back I— Dialectic, Definition, and Being II— Unity of the Topics III— Two Communities in Aristotle's Dialectic IV— Rhetoric and Dialectic Notes Chapter Eleven— Poetry, History, and Dialectic I II III IV Notes Selected Bibliography Primary Texts Secondary Sources Index A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Z About the Contributors