The Limits of Eurocentricity: Imperial British Foreign and Defence Policy in the Early Twentieth Century

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In The Limits of Eurocentricity, Keith Wilson argues that the British Empire did not reorient itself towards Europe at the beginningo f the twentieth century as has long been assumed. CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION. THE LIMITS OF EUROCENTRICITY: The Case of the British Empire 1904-14 1. Prologue to Policy-Making: Sir E. Grey and the National Review articles 1901-2 2. Found and Lost in Translation: Bertie, Cambon, Landsdowne, Delcasse and the Anglo-French ‚alliance‘ of May 1905 3. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905 and the defending of India: the case of the worst-case scenario 4. Creative Accounting: the place of loans to Persia in the commencent of the negotiation of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 5. Passing on the Straits: the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus in Anglo-Russian relations 1904-1907 6. Sir E. Crowe on the origins of the Crowe memorandum of 1 January 1907 7. The Anglo-French Entente re-visited, 1906-1914 8. Hankey’s Appendix: inter-service rivalry during and after the Agadir crisis, 1911 9. Understanding the 'misunderstanding' of 1 August 1914 10. Curzon outwith India: a note on the lost committee on Persia, 1915-1916 11. General Wilson and the Channel Tunnel before and after the Great War