Comparing Cabinets: Dilemmas of Collective Government

Description

Why is cabinet government so resilient? Despite many obituaries, why does it continue to be the vehicle for governing across most parliamentary systems? Comparing Cabinets answers these questions by examining the structure and performance of cabinet government in five democracies: the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Australia. The book is organised around the dilemmas that cabinet governments must solve: how to develop the formal rules and practices that can bring predictability and consistency to decision making; how to balance good policy with good politics; how to ensure cohesion between the factions and parties that constitute the cabinet while allowing levels of self-interest to be advanced; how leaders can balance persuasion and command; and how to maintain support through accountability at the same time as being able to make unpopular decisions. All these dilemmas are continuing challenges to cabinet government, never solvable, and constantly reappearing in different forms. Comparing distinct parliamentary systems reveals how traditions, beliefs, and practices shape the answers. There is no single definition of cabinet government, but rather arenas and shared practices that provide some cohesion. Such a comparative approach allows greater insight into the process of cabinet government that cannot be achieved in the study of any single political system, and an understanding of the pressures on each system by appreciating the options that are elsewhere accepted as common beliefs. Cover Comparing Cabinets: Dilemmas of Collective Government Copyright Acknowledgements Contents List of Figures and Tables Figures Tables List of Abbreviations 1: Understanding Cabinet Government What Is ‘Cabinet Government’? Theoretical Approaches Constitutionalist Institutionalist The Core Executive Networks The Interpretivist Approach Situated Agency Court Government Dilemmas as Plausible Conjectures The Process Dilemma: Predictability vs. Political Imperatives The Policy Dilemma: Puzzling vs. Political Risk The Political Dilemma: Self-Interestvs. Cohesion The Leadership Dilemma: Command vs. Persuasion The Accountability Dilemma: Maintaining Support vs. Making Unpopular Decisions Summary Approach and Methods The Country Selection Part I: National Traditions, Myths, and Practices 2: The United Kingdom: Traditions and Practices Traditions Cabinet Prime Minister Practices and Processes Ministers Confidentiality Practices Conclusion 3: Australia: Traditions and Practices Traditions Cabinet Government Prime Ministers and Ministers Practices 4: The Netherlands: Traditions and Practices Context Prime Minister Cabinet The Civil Service Practices Conclusion 5: Denmark: Traditions and Practices Traditions State–Civil Society Relations Context Prime Minister Cabinet Government The Civil Service Practices: The Duopoly Conclusion 6: Switzerland: Traditions and Practices Traditions The Federal Council Collective Responsibility Practices and Procedures Understanding the Consensus Federal President The Federal Council, Parties, Parliament, and People Conclusion Part II: Dilemmas of Cabinet Government 7: The Process Dilemma: Predictability vs. Political Imperatives? Interpreting Rules, Conventions, Norms, and Expectations The Role of Conventions and Rules Handbooks, Manuals, and Other ‘Rules’ for Cabinet Schedules and Forums Coping with Dilemmas Predictability and Due Process Negotiating the Disagreements No Surprises Conclusion 8: The Policy Dilemma: Puzzling vs. Political Risk Bureaucracy: Evidence-BasedPolicy vs. Partisan Pressures Ministers: Balancing Policy with Politics Special Advisers: Managing the Politics A Process within a Process Conclusion 9: The Political Dilemma: Self-Interest vs. Cohesion Political Prudence Cabinet Politics in Majoritarian Governments Cabinet Politics in Coalition Cabinets Cabinet Politics: No Coalition Agreement Conclusion 10: The Leadership Dilemma: Command vs. Persuasion How to Survive: Leadership and Vulnerability Managing Colleagues: Leading the Ministers Managing the Processes: Agenda Setting and Practices Expanding Responsibilities Support for Prime Ministers and/or Cabinet Central Agencies and Political Staff Central Agencies Political Advisers Conclusion: The Changing Position of Prime Ministers and Presidents 11: The Accountability Dilemma: Maintaining Support vs. Making Unpopular Decisions Dilemma One: Collective Accountability vs. Individual Accountability Dilemma Two: Blame Games and How to Avoid Them Dilemma Three: Success and Failure Conclusion: In Search of Collective Accountability 12: Conclusion: Cabinet Government’s Open Secrets: Flexibility and Resilience Empirical Comparisons Traditions of Continuity or Disruption Party Alignments Accountability to Parliament Stability The Lessons of Comparison Theory Revisited Resilience and Practice Conclusion: Working Myths References Name Index Subject Index