Do We Have Free Will? : A Debate

Description

In this little but profound volume, Robert Kane and Carolina Sartorio debate a perennial question: Do We Have Free Will?　　 Kane introduces and defends libertarianism about free will: free will is incompatible with determinism; we are free; we are not determined. Sartorio introduces and defends compatibilism about free will: free will is compatible with determinism; we can be free even while our actions are determined through and through. Simplifying tricky　terminology and complicated concepts for readers new to the debate, the authors also cover the latest developments on a controversial topic that gets us entangled in questions about blameworthiness and responsibility, coercion and control, and much more.　 Each author first presents their own side, and then they interact through two rounds of objections and replies. Pedagogical features include standard form arguments, section summaries, bolded key terms and principles, a glossary, and annotated reading lists. Short, lively and accessible, the debate showcases diverse and cutting-edge work on free will. As per Saul Smilansky’s foreword, Kane and Sartorio, "present the readers with two things at once: an introduction to the traditional free will problem; and a demonstration of what a great yet very much alive and relevant philosophical problem is like." Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Contents Foreword Opening Statements 1 The Problem of Free Will: A Libertarian Perspective Introduction: An Ancient Problem with Modern Significance 1. Modern Debates and Views 2. The Compatibility Question: Alternative Possibilities and Ultimate Responsibility 3. Self-forming Actions 4. Freedom of Action and Freedom of Will: AP and UR 5. Plurality Conditions and Plural Voluntary Control 6. Will-Setting and Self-formation 7. The Compatibility Question Revisited: Free Will and Moral Responsibility 8. Fair Opportunity to Avoid Wrongdoing: Hart and Others 9. Reactive Attitudes, Criminal Trials and Transference of Responsibility 10. Transference of Responsibility and Compatibility Questions 11. Two Dimensions of Responsibility 12. Compatibilist Responses (I): Conditional Analyses 13. Compatibilist Responses (II): Frankfurt-Style Examples 14. The Intelligibility Question 15. Indeterminism: Empirical and Philosophical Questions 16. Initial Pieces: Self-formation, Efforts, Willpower, Volitional Streams 17. Indeterminism and Responsibility 18. Initial Questions and Objections: Indeterminism and Chance 19. Further Questions and Objections: Phenomenology and Rationality 20. Micro vs. Macro Control 21. Control and Responsibility 22. Agency, Complexity, Disappearing Agents 23. Regress Objections: Responsibility and Character Development 24. The Explanatory Luck Objection: Authors, Stories, Value Experiments and Liberum Arbitrium 25. Contrastive Explanations: Concluding Remarks on Huck Finn and Other Literary Figures 2 Free Will and Determinism: A Compatibilism Introduction 1. What Is a Theory of Free Will? 2. A Sketch of a Theory of Free Will 3. The Free Will Problem: Compatibilism and Incompatibilism 4. The Motivation for Compatibilism 5. Incompatibilist Arguments: Part I 6. Incompatibilist Arguments: Part II Conclusions First Round of Replies 3 Reply to Carolina Sartorio’s Opening Statement Introduction: On Acting Freely: Some Significant Agreements 1. Acting Freely and Free Will: Some Significant Differences 2. Critique of Incompatibilist Views (Part I): The Consequence Argument and Being Powerless over the Past and Laws 3. Critique of Incompatibilist Views (Part II): Being Powerless and Acting Freely 4. Idle Aliens, Frankfurt-Style Examples and the Ability to Do Otherwise 5. Will-Setting, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise 6. Critique of Incompatibilist Views (Part III): Design Arguments 7. Free Will, Design Arguments and Religious Questions Conclusion: Freedom, Determinism, Indeterminism, Causation and Control 4 Reply to Bob Kane’s Opening Statement Introduction 1. Incompatibilist Arguments and Incompatibilist Intuitions 2. Does Free Will Have to Be a Struggle? 3. SFAs, Indeterminism and Alternative Possibilities Second Round of Replies 5 Reply to Carolina Sartorio’s Reply to My Opening Statement 1. Determinism, Formative Circumstances and the Young Man at Trial 2. Free Will and Struggle 3. Self-forming Actions, Indeterminism and Alternative Possibilities 4. Intuitions and Aspirations 6 Reply to Bob Kane’s Reply to My Opening Statement 1. Indeterminism and Free Will 2. Leeway Compatibilism: The Consequence Argument and “Weak” Abilities 3. Source Compatibilism and Frankfurt-Style Cases 4. Concluding Remarks Further Readings Glossary References Index