The United States, Russia And Nuclear Peace

Description

This book analyzes the United States and Russia’s nuclear arms control and deterrence relationships and how these countries must lead current and prospective efforts to support future nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. The second nuclear age, following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, poses new challenges with respect to nuclear-strategic stability, deterrence and nonproliferation. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia, and the potential for new nuclear weapons states in the Middle East, create new possible axes of conflict potentially stressful to the existing world order. Other uncertainties include the interest of major powers in developing a wider spectrum of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, possibly for use in limited nuclear wars, and the competitive technologies for antimissile defenses being developed and deployed by the United States and Russia. Other technology challenges, including the implications of cyberwar for nuclear deterrence and crisis management, are also considered. Political changes also matter. The early post-Cold War hopes for the emergence of a global pacific security community, excluding the possibility of major war, have been dashed by political conflict between Russia and NATO, by the roiled nature of American domestic politics with respect to international security, and by a more assertive and militarily competent China. Additionally, the study includes suggestions for both analysis and policy in order to prevent the renewed U.S.-Russian nuclear arms race and competition in new technologies. This volume would be ideal for graduate students, researchers, scholars and anyone who is interested in nuclear policy, international studies, and Russian politics. Acknowledgments......Page 5 Contents......Page 7 List of Figures......Page 9 List of Tables......Page 10 List of Charts......Page 11 Introduction......Page 13 1.2 Operation “RYAN”......Page 19 1.3 Intermediate Missiles......Page 21 1.4 Defense Shield......Page 22 1.5 Korean Airliner......Page 24 1.6 False Warning......Page 25 1.7 NATO Exercise......Page 26 1.8 The Sister Services......Page 28 1.9 Soviet Nuclear Perspectives......Page 30 1.10 Force Balances and Outcomes......Page 32 1.11 Conclusions......Page 36 2.1 Introduction......Page 42 2.2 Caveats......Page 43 2.3 Reasons for Optimism?......Page 45 2.4 Analysis Near and Far......Page 49 Evaluating the Forces......Page 50 Preliminary Verdict......Page 55 2.5 Conclusion......Page 57 3.1 Introduction......Page 65 Putin’s Challenge......Page 66 Drifting Toward Controversy......Page 68 3.3 Technology and Defenses......Page 69 3.4 Conclusions......Page 74 4.1 Introduction......Page 83 4.2 Chinese Military Modernization and Nuclear Weapons......Page 84 Perspectives......Page 91 Data Analysis......Page 93 Implications......Page 95 4.4 Conclusion......Page 96 5.1 Introduction......Page 104 5.2 Actors and Strategies......Page 105 5.3 What to Do About North Korea: Denuking and What Else?......Page 110 Forces and Outcomes......Page 114 Preliminary Findings and Indications......Page 117 5.5 Conclusions......Page 118 6.1 Introduction......Page 123 6.2 The Trump Nuclear Posture Review......Page 124 6.3 Restraining Presidential Power: Nuclear First Strike and North Korea......Page 129 Preemption or Prevention?......Page 130 Decision-Making and Constitutional Process......Page 133 6.4 Conclusion......Page 135 7.1 Introduction......Page 140 7.2 Deterrence: How Reliable?......Page 141 7.3 Escalation Control: Principles......Page 147 7.4 Escalation Control: New Challenges......Page 150 Approach......Page 155 Analysis......Page 157 7.6 Conclusions......Page 160 8.1 Introduction......Page 167 8.2 Cyber Wars and Information Operations: Perspectives......Page 168 8.3 Information and Infrastructure Operations......Page 170 8.4 Analysis......Page 174 8.5 Conclusion......Page 180 9.1 Introduction......Page 186 9.2 Realism and International Politics......Page 187 Independent or Dependent Variables?......Page 188 Formal or Efficient Causes......Page 189 Deterrence Rationality......Page 192 Historical Perspective......Page 194 9.5 Conclusion......Page 198 10.1 Introduction......Page 205 10.2 Minimum Deterrence: The Larger Context......Page 206 10.3 Alternative Nuclear Futures and Minimum Deterrence......Page 208 Measuring Minimum Deterrence......Page 211 10.5 Conclusion......Page 218 Chapter 11: Conclusion......Page 222 Appendix: Cold War and Present Requirements for US Nuclear C3 System......Page 233 Bibliography......Page 240 Index......Page 258