The European Banking Union and Constitution: Beacon for Advanced Integration or Death-Knell for Democracy?

Description

In 2012, at the height of the sovereign debt crisis, European decision makers pushed for developing an ‘ever closer union’ with the formation of a European Banking Union (BU). Although it provoked widespread debate, to date there has been no coherent discussion of the political and constitutional dimensions of the European Banking Union. This important new publication fills this gap. Drawing on the expertise of recognised experts in the field, it explores banking union from legal, economic and political perspectives. It takes a four-part approach. Firstly, it sets the scene by examining the constitutional foundations of banking union. Then in parts 2 and 3, it looks at the implications of banking union for European integration and for democracy. Finally it asks whether banking union might be more usefully regarded as a trade-off between integration and democracy. This is an important, timely and authoritative collection. Contents Contributors List of Abbreviations 1. The European Banking Union and Constitution – The Overall Challenge I. The Challenge II. An Introduction to the Constitutional Panorama III. The European Banking Union
as a Boost to Integration? IV. The European Banking Union
as a Blow to Democracy? V. Conclusions: The European Banking
Union as a Constitutional Challenge PART I:
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN BANKING UNION 2. The Constitutional Dimension of Banking Union I. Banking Union and the Constitutional
Integrity of EU Law II. Differentiated Integration and the Principle
of Equal Treatment III. The Division of Powers Between
the EU and the Member States IV. The Legal Bases of BU: Novelties
at the Outskirts of Constitutionality V. The Role of the CJEU VI. Conclusions 3. The Thin Red Line Between the OMT Decision and the Banking Union I. The OMT Decision II. The Banking Union: Background and Main Features III. The Interplay between the OMT
and the Banking Union IV. Conclusion PART II: EUROPEAN BANKING UNION AND FULL INTEGRATION 4. The European Banking Union and Integration I. What Role for the Banking Unionin Integration Dynamics? II. Survey on Substantive Laws
(Rulebook) and Institutions III. Some Theoretical Background on Integration
and Regulatory Diversity IV. Integration and Remaining Diversity Within
the European Banking Union V. Integration Dynamism Triggered Beyond
the European Banking Union VI. Conclusions 5. Banking Union and the European Economic Constitution: A Brief Comparison of Regulatory Styles in Banking Regulation and Competition Law I. Introduction II. The Economic Constitution of the European Union III. The Constitutional Relevance of the Banking Union IV. The Structure of the Banking Union V. Banking Union – Constitutional Principles and Regulatory Styles VI. Managerial Regulation vs Rule-based Approach 6. Technocratic and Centralised Decision-making in the Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism: Can Single Market and Banking Union Governance Effectively Co-exist in a Post-Brexit World? I. EU Financial Governance in Steady State? II. Centralised Decision-making and the SSM:
Internal Effects III. SSM Decision-making, the EBA
and Brexit: ESFS Effects IV. Conclusion 7. Single Resolution Board: Lost and Found in the Thicket of EU Bank Regulation I. Explaining the Complex Regulatory Architecture
of EU Bank Oversight II. Legitimacy and Accountability III. What is ‘Specific’ about the Single
Resolution Board? IV. Resolution Planning and ‘Going Concern’
Cooperation Between Financial Regulators V. Resolution-Planning ‘Joints’ of the Banking
Union Regulatory Architecture VI. The SRB in the Thicket of EU Bank Regulation
and the Value of ‘Constraints’ PART III: EUROPEAN BANKING UNION, DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOCRACY 8. Some Reflections on the State of European Democracy with Regard to the Banking Union and the ECB I. Introduction II. Overlapping Lines of Political Contestation
in the EU III. A View on the ECB IV. Democracy, Accountability and Independence V. Accountability of the ECB VI. Conclusion 9. The European Banking Union: A Case of Tempered Supranationalism? I. Introduction II. The Making of the BU III. The Institutional Outcome: The SSM IV. The Institutional Outcome: The SRM V. Conclusions 10. Prudential Supervision and the European Central Bank Credit Data Registry (AnaCredit): Legal Basis and Democratic Accountability I. Introduction II. The Banking Union and the Credit-Risk Reporting
of the European Central Bank (‘AnaCredit’) III. Theoretical Framework of Credit-Risk Data IV. Credit-Risk Data and Prudential Supervision V. Credit Registries in the EU VI. The Legal Basis of AnaCredit: A Democratic Gap? VII. Concluding Remarks 11. The Internal Market and the Banking Union I. Introduction II. Crisis III. Actor IV. Means V. Ex Ante vs Ex Post VI. Regulatory Technique VII. Substance vs Procedure VIII. Accountability and Responsibility IX. Culture X. External/Internal XI. Interim Conclusion XII. Instead of Conclusion 12. Should Non-participating Member States Join the Banking Union? A Legal Perspective I. Introduction II. The Outcome of Entering Close Cooperation III. Wider Ramifications of Opting
In or Out of the Banking Union Index