Normativity : epistemic and practical

Description

What should I do? What should I think? Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first question, while epistemologists tackle the second. This volume is innovative in drawing together issues from epistemology and ethics and in exploring neglected connections between epistemic and practical normativity. Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting: Introduction1: Charity Anderson: Putting Fallibilism to Work2: Jessica Brown: Pragmatic Approaches to Belief3: Ulrike Heuer: The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons4: David Hunter: Directives for Knowledge and Belief5: Benjamin Kiesewetter: How Reasons are Sensitive to Available Evidence6: Clayton Littlejohn: Evidence and its Limits7: Errol Lord: The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason8: Matthew McGrath: Pragmatic Encroachment: Its Problems are Your Problems!9: Kate Nolfi: Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief10: Baron Reed: Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief11: Andrew Reisner: Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity12: Daniel Star: Reasoning with Reasons13: Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen: Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief