The Burden of Proof upon Metaphysical Methods

Description

Who carries the burden of proof in analytic philosophical debates, and how can this burden be satisfied? As it turns out, the answer to this joint question yields a fundamental challenge to the very conduct of metaphysics in analytic philosophy. Empirical research presented in this book indicates that the vastly predominant goal pursued in analytic philosophical dialogues lies not in discovering truths or generating knowledge, but merely in prevailing over one’s opponents. Given this goal, the book examines how most effectively to allocate and discharge the burden of proof. It focuses on premises that must prudently be avoided because a burden of proof on them could never be satisfied, and in particular discusses unsupportable bridge premises across inference barriers, like Hume’s barrier between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, or the barrier between the content of our talk or thought, and the world beyond such content. Employing this content/world barrier for a critical assessment of mainstream analytic philosophical methods, this book argues that we must prudently avoid invoking intuitions or other content of thought or talk in support of claims about the world beyond content, that is, metaphysically significant claims. Yet as content-located evidence is practically indispensable to metaphysical debates throughout analytic philosophy, from ethics to the philosophy of mathematics, this book reaches the startling conclusion that all such metaphysical debates must, prudently, be terminated. The Burden of Proof upon Metaphysical Methods Acknowledgements Contents List of Tables 1: Dialogue and Persuasion 1.1 The Problem of Methodological Conservatism 1.2 Commitments in Attitude and Dialogue 1.3 An Analysis of Philosophical Dialogues Types of Dialogue Philosophers’ Self-Conceptions Methodology Example Analysis: Willoughby (2012) Results Attitudinal Goals 1.4 Looking Ahead References 2: The Burden of Proof 2.1 Egalitarianism versus Foundationalism 2.2 Allocating the Burden of Proof 2.3 The Prudence of Dialogical Egalitarianism in Philosophy References 3: Evidence, Inference, and Empiricism 3.1 Meeting the Burden of Proof 3.2 Evidence 3.3 Implication Barriers 3.4 Addressing Counter-Examples 3.5 Quantitative and Qualitative Barriers 3.6 Empiricism References 4: Philosophical Methods between Content and the World 4.1 Consequences of Dialogical Empiricism 4.2 The Content/World Separation 4.3 Hypotheses in Philosophy Psycho-Linguistic and Non-Psycho-Linguistic Subject Matter Concepts Cognition Necessary Truth 4.4 Evidence in Philosophy Intuitions Common Sense Ordinary Language Usage Theoretical Virtues Method of Cases Reflective Equilibrium Conceptual Analysis and the Canberra Plan Experimental Philosophy 4.5 Against the Content/World Separation The Easy Approach Content Externalism Agential Realism Calibration Mentalism References 5: Metaphysical Hypotheses 5.1 Substantive Consequences 5.2 Normativity 5.3 Necessity 5.4 Epistemology 5.5 Ontology 5.6 Quietism References 6: Escaping Dialogical Empiricism 6.1 Looking Behind 6.2 A Way Around? 6.3 A Way Out? References Appendix A Reputational Journal Ranking Appendix B Population Size Appendix C Example Analyses Appendix D Analysis Results Index