Social Organizations and the Authoritarian State in China

Description

Received wisdom suggests that social organizations (such as non-government organizations, NGOs) have the power to upend the political status quo. However, in many authoritarian contexts, such as China, NGO emergence has not resulted in this expected regime change. In this book, Timothy Hildebrandt shows how NGOs adapt to the changing interests of central and local governments, working in service of the state to address social problems. In doing so, the nature of NGO emergence in China effectively strengthens the state, rather than weakens it. This book offers a groundbreaking comparative analysis of Chinese social organizations across the country in three different issue areas: environmental protection, HIV/AIDS prevention, and gay and lesbian rights. It suggests a new way of thinking about state-society relations in authoritarian countries, one that is distinctly co-dependent in nature: governments require the assistance of NGOs to govern while NGOs need governments to extend political, economic and personal opportunities to exist. Contents List of Tables List of Figures Preface and Acknowledgments Abbreviations 1 Self-Limiting Organizations and Codependent State-Society Relations 1.1 Theoretical Framework 1.1.1 A Unified Theoretical Framework: Society-Sensitive, Disaggregated Corporatism 1.2 Conceptual and Analytical Frameworks 1.3 Case Selection and Research Design 1.4 Outline of the Book PART I Political Opportunities 2 Political Opportunities, by Accident and Design 2.1 Creating Demand for Social Organizations 2.2 Defining the Context for Social Organizations 2.3 Managing Social Organizations 3 Central Policies, Local Priorities 3.1 Expectations for Variation 3.2 Perceptions of the Political Opportunity Structure, Disaggregated 3.3 Central Government Policies Shape Relations With Social Organizations 3.4 Local Politics More Directly Define Relations With Social Organizations 3.4.1 Environmental Protection in Yunnan and Sichuan 3.4.2 HIV/AIDS Prevention in Yunnan and Henan 3.5 Explaining a Negative State Response 3.6 Understanding Bad (and Good) Relations 4 Proximate Solutions to Insoluble Problems 4.1 Become Registered (or, Remain Unregistered) 4.2 Keep the Organizations’ Activities Transparent 4.3 Use Only Nonantagonistic Methods 4.4 Minimize Links with Other Groups 4.5 Adjust to Changing Government Policies 4.6 Indulge Governments Reputational Concerns 4.7 The Costs of Adaptation Part II Economic Opportunities 5 More Money, More Problems 5.1 Money Matters: Foreign Funding, Easy Money 5.2 Organization Leaders as Economic Actors 5.3 Donor-Created, Donor-Driven Organizations 5.4 Oversaturated Market: High Competition, Low Interaction 5.5 Inadequate Funds to Build Capacity: Rich Project, Poor Organization 5.6 Too Few Funders: Low Diversification, High Vulnerability 6 Forever the Twain Shall Meet 6.1 Government as Economic Actor: High Embeddedness, Low Autonomy 6.2 Organizations Without Resources: No Money, No Problems? 6.3 Creating Self-Sustaining Organizations Part III Personal Opportunities 7 Strong Individual Relationships, Weak Institutional Ties 7.1 Deep and Shallow Embeddedness 7.2 The Importance of Individual Organization Leaders 7.3 Taking Full Advantage of Personal Opportunities 7.4 Exploring the Implications of Personal Opportunities 7.4.1 Implications for Social Organizations 7.4.2 Implications for Civil Society 8 Social Organizations and the Future of Chinese Civil Society 8.1 Reviewing Major Findings 8.2 Making Change, at the Margins 8.3 High Costs of Adapting to the Opportunity Structure 8.4 Limitations to Long-Term Viability 8.5 Social Organizations and Regime Resiliency 8.6 From Oppositional to Strategically Limiting Organization (and Back Again) 8.7 Implications for Donors and Policymakers Appendix A Sources and Research Methods A.1 In-depth Interviews A.2 Web-based Survey Appendix B Survey Instrument (Chinese) Bibliography Index