Empire and Constitution in Modern Japan: Why Could War with China Not Be Prevented?

Description

Since the beginning of the Meiji period when Japan evolved into a modern and powerful nation-state, ideas of empire and constitution imbued Japanese rule and progress. In Empire and Constitution in Modern Japan, Junji Banno expertly analyses how these conflicting concepts operated together in Japan from 1868 until 1937. By ‘empire’, Banno means the Japanese impetus to create its own empire; by ‘constitution’, he identifies Japanese efforts to create a constitutional government. In this book, Banno discusses the complicated relationship between these two concepts, ranging from incompatibility in some periods to symbiosis in others. Furthermore, understanding the complex and competing nature of these ideals, he persuasively reasons, is key to our understanding of why Japan and China went to war in 1937, leading to Pearl Harbor just four years later. Translated by eminent scholar Arthur Stockwin, Banno’s highly accessible account of the dynamics of pre-war Japanese political history provides an engaging survey of imperialism and constitutionalism in modern Japan. It will be of vital importance to all scholars of modern Japanese history. Title Page Copyright Page Contents Introduction Part 1: The beginnings of ‘Empire’ and ‘Constitution’ Chapter 1: Defeating China – towards a ‘small empire’ Split in the new Meiji government The Japan–China confrontation over Ryūkyū – the Taiwan expedition Ōkubo Toshimichi’s peace negotiations Chapter 2: Demanding a constitutional system of government The Ōsaka Conference The Imperial Edict establishing a constitutional structure The Edict establishing a Parliament: Ending of the constitution-building period From the Kanghwado Incident to the Popular Rights Movement Miscalculation by Inoue Kaoru Fukuzawa Yukichi and Inoue Kaoru Alienation – postponing the establishment of a Parliament Chapter 3: The Imo (Jingo) and Kapsin (Kōshin) Incidents – ‘Empire’ once again The China threat argument and the return of the ‘strong army’ argument Changing relationship between Japan and Korea, and advent of confrontation between Japan and China The subtle ‘Asianism’ of Fukuzawa Yukichi: Underestimation of China China becoming a ‘strong power’ – the Imo [Korean] or Jingo [Japanese] Incident Towards naval rearmament Breakdown in the reform of Korea – the Kapsin [Korean] or Kōshin [Japanese] Incident If war breaks out, is victory assured? Avoidance of war by Itō Hirobumi – the Tianjin Treaty Chapter 4: The Sino-Japanese War: The birth of ‘Empire’ and the continuation of ‘Constitution’ Towards military expansion before launching the Diet Dispute between the House of Representatives and the government – stagnation of military expansion The Imperial Edict on Harmony and Cooperation Europeanization and nationalism Towards the Sino-Japanese War Opposition from the Meiji Emperor The conclusion of the war The Japan–China Treaty and the triple intervention Part 2: The division between ‘Empire’ and ‘Constitution’ Introduction: The system of apportionment between peace and democracy Chapter 5: Strong army and war weariness: ‘Empire’ and ‘Constitution’ before the Russo-Japanese War ‘Constitution’ did not aspire to ‘Empire’ Neither the government nor the people wanted to fight a war with Russia Expansion of the army and navy following the Sino-Japanese War Why did the navy speed up its rearmament? Chapter 6: From the Russo-Japanese War to the First World War: Struggle between ‘Empire’ and ‘Constitution’ Going to war with powerful Russia Korea becoming a protectorate, and the partition of Manchuria The Imperial Defence Policy Where were the real potential enemies? The 1923 crisis Naval stratagems We shall not make ‘War’ but we shall pursue ‘Rearmament’ Resistance to Taishō democracy and compromise with it Iaku jōsō – Did the Imperial Defence Policy without cabinet recognition have no influence? Positive policy and rearmament The Katsura–Saionji system – the Katsura bureaucratic clique plus the army versus the Saionji Seiyūkai plus the navy The emergence of urban commerce and industry The pluralization of conflicts of interest Progress of the democratization movement Chapter 7: From the Taishō Political Change to the Siemens Affair: Stagnation of ‘Empire’ and Surge of ‘Constitution’ Twin deficits Why was public opinion lenient towards the navy, but severe towards the army? Concentrated fire in favour of military rearmament The Taishō Political Crisis From the army to the navy The ‘positive policies’ of the Yamamoto Gonbei government The Siemens Affair The revenge of the House of Peers The collapse of both the navy cabinet and the Seiyūkai Chapter 8: The twenty-one demands to China: ‘Constitution’ domestically, ‘Empire’ externally The rise of Yoshino Sakuzō The argument about introducing universal suffrage Key points of ‘Constitution’ From ‘Constitution’ to ‘Empire’ The First World War and the twenty-one demands to China Disdain for China, disdain for America A strange political party – split between peace and democracy Part 3: The End of ‘Constitution’ and ‘Empire’ Introduction: Japan between the two wars Chapter 9: What happened between the two world wars? A new world order The great conversion of the Seiyūkai The failure of Shidehara diplomacy – the Manchurian Incident The formal recognition of Manchukuo The London Naval Disarmament Treaty Failure of the policy of not allowing the affair to spread The 5-15 Incident and the death of party cabinets The influence of the 2-26 Incident The abortive Ugaki Kazushige Cabinet The Marco Polo Bridge Incident and despatch of three Japanese divisions Full-scale war without a war declaration Chapter 10: Three episodes between the two world wars First period: ‘Constitution’ and ‘non-Empire’ under the Hara Kei Cabinet A fundamental shift in China policy The argument that the General Staff Office should be abolished Second period: Counterattack in favour of ‘Empire’ under the cabinet of Tanaka Giichi The plan to take over Manchuria and Mongolia Third period: The clash between ‘Constitution’ and ‘Empire’ over the Manchurian Incident Control of the Kantōgun at one point succeeded An unfortunate chain of small mistakes Stimson’s failure Breakdown of the non-expansion policy Extinction of ‘epochs’ The upsurge of the Shakai Taishūtō (Social Masses Party) How can democracy stop war? Conclusion: Irresponsible ‘Empire’ without ‘Constitution’ Points and lines A lengthy war of attrition – why did a peace settlement prove impossible? The Japanese people became a different people Peace settlement opinion Anti-Japanese sentiment The growing strength of the Chinese Communist Party I am now nostalgic about the old days I used to hate so much There should be no war between Japan and China Notes Introduction Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Introduction to Part 2 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Chapter 10 Conclusion Index