Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed

Description

Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed offers a comprehensive history of intention in rabbinic classical law, tracing developments in legal thought, and demonstrating how intention became a nuanced, differentially applied concept across a wide array of legal realms. Half Title Series Information Title Page Copyright Page Contents Preface Introduction 1 Summary of Findings 2 Previous Scholarship and Methodology 3 Methodological Concerns 4 Historical Context of the Bavli: Hellenistic, Christian, Zoroastrian 5 Outline of Chapters 6 A Note on Gender Pronouns Chapter 1 From Tannaitic to Early Amoraic Law: Contrasting Systems of Tort Law in the Yerushalmi and Bavli 1 Overview of Tort Law in Tannaitic Sources 2 M. Bava Qama 2:6: “A Person Is Always Forewarned” 2.1 Yerushalmi: R. Isaac on the Necessity of Fault 2.2 Bavli: Strict Liability 3 M. Bava Qama 3:1: Exemption for Accidental Damages 3.1 Yerushalmi: Rav, Samuel and R. El’azar: Liability Determined by Fault 3.2 Bavli: Rav, Samuel and R. Yohanan: Strict Liability 3.3 Bavli and Yerushalmi: Identical Traditions, Divergent Rulings 4 Contextualizing Tort Liability in the Yerushalmi 5 Contextualizing Tort Liability in the Bavli Chapter 2 The Third Generation of Babylonian Amoraim: A Period of Transition 1 Overview: The Emergence of Competing Schools of Thought in Pumbedita and Mahoza 2 Pumbedita: Negligence and Deliberate Action in the Rulings of Rabbah 2.1 B. Bava Qama 26b-27a: Strict Liability and Negligence 2.2 B. Bava Qama 56a: Liability for Negligence 2.3 B. Bava Qama 28b-29b: Intent to Act 3 Mahoza: Negligence and Purposeful Action 3.1 R. Nahman: Purpose Defines the Prohibition 3.2 Mitasseq and Melakhah She-eina Tzerikha Le-gufa: Exemptions in the Laws of the Sabbath 3.3 R. Hisda: Intention in the Fulfillment of Religious Precepts 4 Summary Chapter 3 The Fourth Generation of Babylonian Amoraim: A Period of Innovation 1 Overview 2 Pumbedita: Abaye 2.1 Challenge to Rabbah’s Strict Liability 2.2 Challenges Regarding the Laws of the Sabbath 3 Mahoza: Rava 3.1 Tort Law 3.1.1 B. Bava Qama 27b: Rights of Pedestrians 3.1.2 B. Bava Metzia 96b: Borrower’s Rights 3.1.3 B. Bava Metzia 83a: Borrower’s Oath 3.1.4 B. Bava Qama 62a: Guarding a Golden Dinar 3.2 Religious Law: Intention in the Laws of the Sabbath 4 Rava in Contrast to Abaye in Religious Law 4.1 B. Sanhedrin 61b: Idol Worship out of Love and Fear 4.2 B. Sanhedrin 74a-b: Martyrdom 4.3 B. Shabbat 72b-73a: Davar She-ein Mitkavvein 4.4 B. Menahot 64a: Action versus Intention 5 Rava’s Emphasis on Intention: Precedents and Parallels 5.1 Land of Israel Precedents 5.2 Parallels in Zoroastrian Literature 6 Rava’s Jurisprudence and Aristotelian Corrective Justice 6.1 Aristotle on Corrective Justice 6.2 Parallels with Rava 6.3 Reading Aristotle in Mahoza? Chapter 4 Mitzvot Ein Tzerikhot Kavvanah: Divorcing Ritual Performance from Intention 1 Overview: A Radical Change in Ritual Law 2 The Development of Mitzvot Ein Tzerikhot Kavvanah 2.1 The Mishnaic View: Shema, Shofar, Megillah 2.2 Early Amoraic Views: Accidental Immersion 2.3 Rava’s View 3 Rava’s Ruling in Context 3.1 The Bavli Context: Intent in Tort Law and Religious Violations 3.2 Cultural Context: Zoroastrian and Monastic Texts 4 Summary Chapter 5 Views in the Bavli after Rava 1 Overview: The Late Amoraim and the Bavli’s Redactors 2 Rava’s Students 2.1 Continuity 2.2 Innovation: Manslaughter 3 The Redactors 3.1 Intent to Derive Benefit/Pleasure: Davar She-ein Mitkavvein and Hana’at Atzmo 4 Summary Conclusion: Intentionality in Rabbinic Law in Historical and Cultural Perspective 1 Transitions from Subjective to Objective Standards in Legal Thought 2 The “Evolution” of Legal Systems 3 Intention and the Self 4 Intention, Argumentation, and Conceptualization Bibliography General Index Source Index