ENGLISH

The Theory of Extensive Form Games

By Klaus Ritzberger (auth.) , Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Book information

Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Year
2016
ISBN
978-3-662-49942-9, 978-3-662-49944-3
DOI
10.1007/978-3-662-49944-3
Language
english
Format
PDF
Filesize
3 MB (3272739 bytes)
Series
Springer Series in Game Theory
Edition
1
Pages
XV, 239\251
Time added
2016-07-20 04:00:00
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/MathematicaEconomicsSocial and Behav. Sciences

Description

This book treats extensive form game theory in full generality. It provides a framework that does not rely on any finiteness assumptions at all, yet covers the finite case. The presentation starts by identifying the appropriate concept of a game tree. This concept represents a synthesis of earlier approaches, including the graph-theoretical and the decision-theoretical ones. It then provides a general model of sequential, interpersonal decision making, called extensive decision problems. Extensive forms are a special case thereof, which is such that all strategy profiles induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Requiring the existence of immediate predecessors yields discrete extensive forms, which are still general enough to cover almost all applications. The treatment culminates in a characterization of the topologies on the plays of the game tree that admit equilibrium analysis.

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