Free Will: Historical and Analytic Perspectives

Description

This novel contributed volume advances the current debate on free will by bridging the divide between analytic and historically oriented approaches to the problem. With thirteen chapters by leading academics in the field, the volume is divided into three parts: free will and determinism, free will and indeterminism, and free will and moral responsibility. The contributors aim to initiate a philosophical discourse that profits from a combination of the two approaches. On the one hand, the analytic tools familiar from the debate – arguments, concepts, and distinctions – can be used to sharpen our understanding of classical philosophical positions. On the other hand, the rich philosophical tradition can be reconstructed so as to inspire new solutions. In recent years, the problem of free will has received special attention in the analytic arena. This is the first anthology to combine historical and analytic perspectives, significantly furthering the debate, and providing a crucial resource to academics and advanced students alike. Contents Notes on Contributors 1: Introduction 1 Aims and Scope 2 The Problem(s) of Free Will 3 Proposed Solutions to the Problem(s) of Free Will 4 Overview of the Contributions References Part I: Free Will and Determinism 2: What Is Determinism? Why We Should Ditch the Entailment Definition 1 What Is the Thesis We Are Worried About When We Worry About Free Will? 2 The Relationship Between (MD) and (ED) 3 Deciding on the Definition of Determinism 4 Why (MD) Is to Be Preferred to (ED) as a Definition of Determinism References 3: Aristotle and the Discovery of Determinism 1 Preface: Three Types of Determinism in Aristotle 2 Logical Determinism: Future Truth 3 Physical Determinism 4 Ethical Determinism 5 Limitations on What Is ‘Up to Us’ 6 Determinate But ‘Up to Us’? References 4: Defending Free Will 1 Basic Issues 2 Digression: The Crucial Contrast Between Events and Eventuations References 5: Some Free Thinking About ‘Thinking About Free Will’ 1 Introduction: The Problem of Free Will 2 Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument 3 The Fixity of Descriptions of the Past 3.1 How van Inwagen Justifies His Assumption 3.2 Why van Inwagen’s Attempt to Justify His Assumption Fails Identity of Necessarily Equivalent Propositions Descriptivism About Proper Names Deflationism About the Past 4 Conclusion References 6: Local-Miracle Compatibilism: A Critique 1 The Consequence Argument: The Conditional Version 2 Local-Miracle Compatibilism 3 Reply to Multiple-Pasts Compatibilism 4 Reply to Local-Miracle Compatibilism 5 Freedom and Counterfactuals 6 The Fixed Future and the Open Past References 7: Backtracking Counterfactuals and Agents’ Abilities 1 Introduction 2 Fixed-Laws Compatibilism: A Primer 3 Different Modalities? 4 Fischer’s Argument for (FPFL) 5 Counterfactuals and Rationality References 8: Moral Necessity, Agent Causation, and the Determination of Free Actions in Clarke and Leibniz 1 Introduction 2 Brief Overview of Leibniz’s Theory of Freedom 3 Activity, Self-Motion, and Agent-Causation in Clarke 4 Determination, Moral Necessity, and Final Causation in Clarke 4.1 God’s Inability to Choose Sub-optimal Options 4.2 Divine Freedom and Moral Necessity 4.3 Human Freedom 4.4 Clarkean Determination and Freedom 4.5 The Determination by Final and Occasional Causes 5 Equipoise in Clarke 6 Comparison and Conclusion References Part II: Free Will and Indeterminism 9: Indeterministic Compatibilism 1 Introduction 2 The Compatibility of Compatibilism with Indeterminism 3 Indeterministic Causation and Probability-Raising 4 Indeterminism, Causal Underdetermination, and Causal Indeterminacy 5 Conclusions References 10: The Culpability Problem and the Indeterminacy of Choice 1 Peter van Inwagen’s Description of the Problem 2 Are Forms of Determinism and Indeterminism Conceivable That Might Not Be Contradictory? 3 Personally Localized Indeterminism and Its Aporetic Consequences for the Possibility of Controlled Decision 4 Decisions in a Situation of Personally Localized Indeterminism 5 The Most Possible Course of Action According to Rational Principles: Aquinas’s Idea of a Rational Consilium of Free Decisions 6 Sameness of Laws of Nature with a Potential Difference of Principles of Choice 7 General Determinism and the Ability to Decide Otherwise References 11: Ambivalent Freedom: Kant and the Problem of Willkür 1 The Problem of Willkür 2 The Conceptual History of Willkür 3 Kant and the Problem of Willkür 3.1 Willkür and Transcendental Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason 3.2 Willkür and Autonomy in the Critique of Practical Reason 3.3 Willkür and Maxim in Kant’s Religion 3.4 Willkür and Will in the Metaphysics of Morals 4 Willkür and Free Will in the Analytic Debate on Freedom 5 Conclusion References 12: Determination, Chance and David Hume: On Freedom as a Power 1 Freedom and the Distinctiveness of Blame 2 Freedom as Agent-Causation 3 Determination and Contingency 4 Hume’s Argument Again References Part III: Free Will and Moral Responsibility 13: Kant’s Justification of Freedom as a Condition for Moral Imputation 1 Moral Responsibility, Imputation and the Required Sense of Freedom 2 Making Room for Freedom: The Compatibility of Transcendental Freedom and Determinism 3 The Practical Justification of Freedom 4 Pereboom on Kant’s Practical Justification of Freedom 4.1 Does Kant’s Justification of Transcendental Freedom Suffice to Legitimate Practices of Holding Each Other Responsible? 5 Conclusion References 14: Does “Ought” Imply “Can”? References Name Index Subject Index