The False Promise of Superiority: The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War

Description

This political analysis exposes the fanciful logic that the United States can use nuclear weapons to vanquish nuclear adversaries or influence them when employing various coercive tactics. During the Cold War, American policymakers sought nuclear advantages to offset an alleged Soviet edge. Policymakers hoped that US nuclear capabilities would safeguard deterrence, when backed perhaps by a set of coercive tactics. But policymakers also hedged their bets with plans to fight a nuclear war to their advantage should deterrence fail. In The False Promise of Superiority, James H. Lebovic argues that the US approach was fraught with peril and remains so today. He contends that the United States can neither simply impose its will on nuclear adversaries nor safeguard deterrence using these same coercive tactics without risking severe, counterproductive effects. As Lebovic shows, the current faith in US nuclear superiority could produce the disastrous consequences that US weapons and tactics are meant to avoid. This book concludes that US interests are best served when policymakers resist the temptation to use, or prepare to use, nuclear weapons first or to brandish nuclear weapons for coercive effect. Cover The False Promise of Superiority Copyright Dedication Contents Preface Acknowledgments 1. The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War PART I ASSESSING NUCLEAR CAPABILITY 2. The Cold-​War Nuclear Force Balance: The Challenge and Promise of Asymmetry 3. Nuclear “Superiority” after the Cold War PART I I COERCIVE TACTICS 4. Commitment 5. Risk Manipulation 6. Resolve and Reputation PART I I I CASE STUDIES 7. When Tactics Consume Strategy: Decision Making in the Cuban Missile Crisis 8. When Red Lines Consume Debate: Thwarting Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions 9. The Case for Nuclear Superiority: Assessing What We Know (and Do Not Know) about Nuclear Deterrence Notes References Index