The Philosophy of Husserl

Description

As the founding father of phenomenology, one of the twentieth century's most significant philosophical movements, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) has been hugely influential in the development of contemporary continental philosophy. This introduction examines chronologically the whole of Husserl's phenomenology as it is presented in the published corpus. The first part explores his early investigations into the formation of mathematical and logical concepts in our cognitive life, which sparked the development of his method of ""descriptive psychology"". In Part 2 Hopkins investigates his Cartesian.;Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Table of Contents; Acknowledgements; Abbreviations; Prolegomenon: Husserl's turn to history and pure phenomenology; I. Plato's and Aristotle's theory of eidē; 1. Plato's Socratic theory of eidē: the first pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology; 2. Plato's arithmological theory of eidē: the second pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology; 3. Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of eidē: the third (and final) pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology. Cover Half Title Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Table of Contents Acknowledgements Abbreviations Prolegomenon: Husserl's turn to history and pure phenomenology I. Plato's and Aristotle's theory of eidē 1. Plato's Socratic theory of eidē: the first pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology 2. Plato's arithmological theory of eidē: the second pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology 3. Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of eidē: the third (and final) pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology. II. From descriptive psychology to transcendentally pure phenomenology4. Origin of the task of pure phenomenology 5. Pure phenomenology and Platonism 6. Pure phenomenology as the transcendental-phenomenological investigation of absolute consciousness 7. Transcendental phenomenology of absolute consciousness and phenomenological philosophy 8. Limits of the transcendental-phenomenological investigation of pure consciousness III. From the phenomenology of transcendental consciousness to that of monadological intersubjectivity 9. Phenomenological philosophy as transcendental idealism. 10. The intersubjective foundation of transcendental idealism: the immanent transcendency of the world's objectivityIV. From monadological intersubjectivity to the historical a priori constitutive of all meaning 11. The pure phenomenological motivation of Husserl's turn to history 12. The essential connection between intentional history and actual history 13. The historicity of both the intelligibility of ideal meanings and the possibility of actual history 14. Desedimentation and the link between intentional history and the constitution of a historical tradition. 15. Transcendental phenomenology as the only true explanation of objectivity and all meaningful problems in previous philosophyV. The unwarranted historical presuppositions guiding the fundamental ontological and deconstructive criticisms of transcendental philosophy 16. The methodological presupposition of the ontico-ontological critique of intentionality: Plato's Socratic seeing of the eidē 17. The mereological presupposition of fundamental ontology: that Being as a whole has a meaning overall. 18. The presupposition behind the proto-deconstructive critique of intentional historicity: the conflation of intra subjective and inter subjective idealities19. The presupposition behind the deconstruction of phenomenology: the subordination of being to speech Epilogue: Transcendental-phenomenological criticism of the criticism of phenomenological cognition Coda: Phenomenological self-responsibility and the singularity of transcendental philosophy Notes Bibliography Index.