Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization: The Political Cost-Effectiveness of Outsourcing Security

Description

This book investigates the connection between tightening mobilization constraints and the use of PMSCs in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Drawing on neoclassical realism and institutionalist theory, it conceptualizes democracies’ use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) as an attempt to circumvent the tightening constraints on the mobilization of military power. The use of private military contractors is less subjected to parliamentary restrictions and less visible to public opinion than the deployment of soldiers. Rather than cheaper in financial terms, PMSCs are therefore politically cost-effective, as they enable decision-makers to minimize the institutional obstacles on conducting military operations and the electoral costs attached thereto. The need to reduce the ex ante hurdles and the ex post costs of military deployments fills the blind spots of alternative explanations for the use of PMSCs based on effectiveness, ideology, and organizational interests. Acknowledgments Contents About the Author Abbreviations List of Figures List of Tables 1 Introduction 1.1 The State of the Art on Private Military and Security Companies 1.2 Research Design and Methodology 1.3 Private Military Providers: In Search of a Definition 1.3.1 Mercenaries, PMCs, PSCs, PMSCs, Contractors 1.3.2 PMSCs and Their Activities 1.4 Plan of the Book 2 Military Privatization and the Evolution of State Power 2.1 The Purchasing of Military Labor in Historical Perspective 2.2 PMSCs and the State Today 2.2.1 PMSCs and the Decline of State Powers: A Problematic Connection 2.2.2 PMSCs as Providers of Combat: The Exception Rather Than the Rule 2.2.3 Weber’s Monopoly of Legitimate Violence Revisited 2.2.4 The Market of the 2000s: A Monopsony of Military Services 2.3 Privatization and Control Over the Use of Force Within States 2.4 Conclusion 3 Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization: A New Theoretical Explanation 3.1 The Study of Military Innovation and Change 3.1.1 Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction Constraints 3.1.2 Institutionalist Theories and the Political Costs of Military Operations 3.2 Ex Ante Hurdles, Ex Post Costs, and the Use of PMSCs 3.3 Competing Explanations 3.3.1 Privatization as a Boost to Military Effectiveness: A Functionalist Explanation 3.3.2 Privatization and (Neo)Liberalism: An Ideational Explanation 3.3.3 Privatization and Bureaucratic Preferences: An Organizational Explanation 3.4 Conclusion 4 Military Privatization in the United States 4.1 Contractor Support in the US: A Historical Overview 4.1.1 From World War I to Korea 4.1.2 Contractor Support in Vietnam 4.1.3 The Policy Foundations of US Contractor Support 4.1.4 Military Privatization After the End of the Cold War 4.2 Contractor Support in the Twenty-First Century 4.2.1 US Government Agencies Purchasing Contractor Support 4.2.2 Military Privatization in US Military Doctrine 4.3 The Privatization of US Military Support in Iraq: A New Military Force Structure 4.4 Mobilization Constraints and US Military Operations 4.4.1 State-Building on a Light Footprint 4.4.2 Contractor Support in Iraq: A Doctrine of Necessity? 4.4.3 Outsourcing a Counterinsurgency: A Suboptimal Military Strategy 4.5 Conclusion 5 Military Privatization in the United Kingdom 5.1 Contractor Support in the UK: A Historical Overview 5.1.1 Hired and Foreign Forces in the British Empire 5.1.2 Watchguard and Beyond: The Rise of British PMSCs 5.1.3 UK Military Logistics in the Twentieth Century 5.2 UK Contractor Support in the Twenty-First Century 5.2.1 UK Government Agencies Military Privatization Policies 5.2.2 Contractor Support in UK Military Doctrine 5.3 The Privatization of British Military Support in Afghanistan 5.4 Mobilization Constraints and UK Military Operations 5.4.1 The War on Terrorism and British Domestic Politics 5.4.2 Contractor Support as a Force Multiplier: Evidence from Afghanistan 5.4.3 The Problematic Implications of Contractor Support 5.4.4 After Afghanistan: The Privatization of UK Vessel Protection 5.5 Conclusion 6 Military Privatization in Italy 6.1 Military Privatization in Italy: A Historical Overview 6.2 Italian Contractor Support in the Twenty-First Century 6.2.1 The Legal and Doctrinal Foundation of Italian Contractor Support 6.2.2 Privatizing Italian Military Logistics: Beyond the Self-Sufficiency Dogma? 6.3 The Privatization of Armed Security in Iraq and on Merchant Ships 6.3.1 Italian Diplomatic Security in Nassirya After Soldiers’ Withdrawal 6.3.2 The Privatization of Vessel Protection After the “Marò” Case 6.4 Mobilization Constraints and Italian Military Operations 6.4.1 Italian Domestic Politics and the Conduct of Military Operations: A Tight Straitjacket? 6.4.2 Ex Ante Hurdles, Ex Post Costs, and Italy’s Use of Armed Contractors 6.4.3 Italian Contractor Support as a Second-Best Option 6.5 Conclusion 7 Explaining Contractor Support to Missions Abroad: A Congruence Test 7.1 Mobilization Constraints 7.1.1 Ex Ante Hurdles and the Use of PMSCs 7.1.2 Ex Post Costs and the Political Cost-Effectiveness of Military Privatization 7.2 Competing Explanations 7.2.1 The Use of PMSCs as a Functionalist Calculus 7.2.2 Ideology and Military Privatization 7.2.3 Organizational Preferences and Contractor Support 7.3 Conclusion 8 Conclusions 8.1 Future Research Avenues 8.1.1 Combining Mobilization Constraints and Other Explanations 8.1.2 Investigating Non-Democratic Regimes 8.1.3 Mobilization Constraints and Technology References Index